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1Harassing Women with Power: 
The Case for Including Contra-power Harassment within Title VII 
 
Ann Carey Juliano*
For DeAngelis, the price of success as the police 
department’s first woman sergeant included transitory 
ribbing by [an anonymous harasser].1
A subordinate propositions his store manager for sex and grabs her breasts.2 A female 
production supervisor is threatened by electricians she supervises.3 A female supervisor is called 
a bitch and a whore and has a paperweight thrown at her.4
In each of these instances, and in many others, the person subject to the harassment is a 
supervisor – a woman (generally) who, at least formally, possesses power over those who are 
harassing her.  Traditionally, sexual harassment was considered an abuse of power in the 
workplace.  If this is true, how can female supervisors be harassed?  Or are they harassed, but not 
within the meaning of employment discrimination law?  Is such behavior simply the “price of 
success”?  In this article, I examine the phenomenon of subordinates harassing supervisors and 
argue that the law must consider different concepts of power so that these claims fall within the 
protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5
As hard as it is to believe, in the early days after the enactment of Title VII, what would 
now be considered the most obvious case of harassment - a supervisor demanding sexual favors 
from a subordinate - did not violate the prohibition on discrimination “because of sex.”  Rather, 
courts brushed aside such claims as simply difficult interpersonal relationships between 
supervisors and employees.  When advocates for women in the workplace first began to bring 
claims of sexual harassment, they had to articulate why sexual harassment is “discrimination 
because of sex” such that the employer should be liable.  Advocates struggled hard to show that 
sexual harassment is not about sex but rather about the misuse of power in the workplace.  
Supervisors were misusing their power in order to extract sexual behavior from women.  Courts 
eventually accepted these claims as cognizable under Title VII.6
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1 DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1995). 
2 Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996). 
3 Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 2004). 
4 Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672, 678 (S.D. Tex. 1995). 
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).   
6 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (stating it is unlawful employment 
practice for employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).   
2These early sexual harassment claims were known as quid pro quo claims - where a 
supervisor demanded sexual favors in exchange for the award of or retention of tangible job 
benefits.  However, women subject to environments filled with sexual innuendo, sexualized 
physical contact and sexist comments were left without a remedy.  Once again, advocates sought 
to explain why such behavior, even in the absence of tangible employment actions, constituted 
discrimination because of sex.   
 Originally recognized in a race discrimination claim, courts eventually held that “hostile 
environments” based on sex violated Title VII.7 Under Title VII, behavior that alters the “terms 
or conditions” of employment “because of sex” is prohibited.8 Further, courts accepted that an 
employer may be liable under Title VII when this hostile environment is created by co-workers.9
In such a situation, the employer is liable not due to the occurrence of the harassment but due to 
the employer’s lack of response to the hostile environment.10 These hostile environment claims 
sought to address the norms of the workplace which operate to exclude and ostracize women.11 
More recently, the rise of complaints brought wherein the harasser and the victim are of 
the same sex (known as same-sex harassment) engendered much discussion in the literature as to 
why same-sex harassment should be covered by Title VII.  How can harassment by a man 
against another man be discrimination “because of sex?”     
 The circuit courts were split until the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia, held that Title VII does cover same-sex harassment.12 He emphasized that a plaintiff 
must prove that the behavior occurred “because of” the sex of the victim.13 In emphasizing the 
plain language of the statute, the Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Refining Services, Inc. decision 
allowed same-sex harassment claims for hostile environments created by both supervisors and 
co-workers.14 It may seem that the Court has allowed claims based on every possible 
permutation to be actionable under Title VII.15 
7 See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972) (interpreting §703(a)(1) of Title VII liberally so as to 
prohibit existence of pervasive discrimination in work environments, presence of which leads to complete 
destruction of emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers).  See also Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recognizing further that hostile environment sexual discrimination violates Title 
VII).   
8 Although Title VII does not expressly prohibit sexual harassment, the Supreme Court has held that such behavior 
is discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to the terms, conditions or privileges of employment and therefore 
violates Title VII.  See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. 
9 See, e.g., Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999); Andrews v. Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 
1990); Barrett v. Omaha Nat’l Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). 
10 See Williams, 187 F.3d at 561; Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486; Barrett, 726 F.2d at 427; Katz, 709 F.2d at 255.  
11 See Kathyrn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Gender Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
1183, 1198-1202 (1989). 
12 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ref. Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
13 Id. at 80.  For a further discussion of the “because of sex” requirement, see infra Part IVC. 
14 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-80 (explaining that there is no justification in statutory language of Title VII or in 
Court’s precedents for absolute rule excluding same-sex harassment claims “because of sex” merely because parties 
involved are of same sex).   
15 Indeed, many commentators have argued that sexual harassment litigation is out of control.  See David E. 
Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 133, 136-48 (1999); Michael S. 
Greve, Sexual Harassment: Telling the Other Victims’ Story, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 523, 529-41 (1993); Mark 
McLaughlin Hager, Harassment As a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 
CONN. L. REV. 375, 393-99 (1998).  Others have argued courts are unnecessarily taking steps to restrict the claim.  
See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 71, 119-33 (1999); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 
U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 719-35 (2000); Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment 
3However, there is one remaining fact pattern that has not been addressed by the Court.  
This scenario encompasses a set of circumstances outside of the norm, much like the same-sex 
harassment cases.  It involves the harassment of supervisors by subordinates and has been termed 
“contra-power” harassment.16 Social science research shows that contra-power harassment is a 
problem,17 but such fact patterns rarely reach the courts.18 Similarly, legal academia has not 
considered the issue in any depth.19 
In this article, I examine the judiciary’s treatment of contra-power harassment cases and 
whether contra-power harassment should be an actionable claim under Title VII.  Determining 
whether contra-power harassment should be a cognizable claim requires considering the 
underlying theory as to why sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII.  If sexual harassment 
is, as feminist legal theorists have argued, an abuse of power to keep women in their traditional 
roles as passive, sexual beings, why should contra-power harassment be actionable?  When 
women have organizational power, how can they be harassed and why should the law protect 
them if they do not protect themselves?  The answers to these questions necessitate the 
consideration of differing conceptions of power and the expectations for the exercise of such 
power.20 Accepting contra-power harassment as an actionable claim requires courts to conceive 
of “power” in a different manner than a hierarchical/organizational power.   
 I argue in this article that courts should conceive of power in a sociocultural manner and 
accept contra-power harassment claims.  Considering claims of contra-power harassment is the 
next step in securing workplace equality for women.  Women who reach management status 
leave in higher percentages than men who are managers.21 Women find that after they fight their 
way to the top (or close to the top or even the middle), the fight continues.  That is, women still 
face behavior designed to remind them that they are unwelcome in workplaces.  In fact, most 
 
Sexual Harassment To Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 
MD. L. REV. 85, 134-42 (2003); Vivien Toomey Montz, Shifting Parameters: An Examination of Recent Changes 
in the Baseline of Actionable Conduct for Hostile Working Environment Sexual Harassment, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & 
L. 809, 832-36 (2002). 
16 Although the use of this term necessarily buys into the concept of power as only an organizational, hierarchical 
concept, I will use the term over other options such as “subordinate initiated harassment,” see Keirsten Stewart 
Moore, Perceptions of Sexual Harassment in Organizational Settings: The Case of Subordinate-Initiated Harassment 
(1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with author), or “bottom-up harassment,” see 
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1767 n.444 (1998).  Contra-power 
harassment appears to be the accepted term in social science research.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Grauerholz, Sexual 
Harassment of Women Professors by Students: Exploring the Dynamics of Power, Authority, and Gender in a 
University Setting, 21 SEX ROLES 789 (1989); Jim Matchen & Eros DeSouza, The Sexual Harassment of Faculty 
Members by Students, 42 SEX ROLES 295 (2000); Kathleen McKinney, Sexual Harassment of University Faculty by 
Colleagues and Students, 23 SEX ROLES 421 (1990); Kathleen M. Rospenda, Judith A. Richman & Stephanie J. 
Nawyn, Doing Power: The Confluence of Gender, Race, and Class in Contra-power Sexual Harassment, 12 
GENDER & SOC’Y 40 (1998); Margaret Schneider & Susan P. Phillips, A Qualitative Study of Sexual Harassment of 
Female Doctors by Patients, 45 SOC. SCI. MED. 669 (1997); Julie Holliday Wayne, Disentangling the Power Bases 
of Sexual Harassment: Comparing Gender, Age and Position Power, 57 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 301 (2000). 
17 See infra Part IA. 
18 See infra Part III.  
19 For a further discussion of the limited extent to which legal scholars have addressed contra-power harassment, see 
infra note 110 and accompanying text.   
20 For a discussion of the different conceptions of power and a comparative assessment of each, see infra Part IIA.    
21 See Hazel M. Rosin & Karen Korabik, Workplace Variables, Affective Responses, and Intention to Leave Among 
Women Managers, 64 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 317, 317, 327-28 (1991). 
4women plateau at the middle management level.22 These middle managers must negotiate the 
roles of supervisor, subordinate and woman in the workplace.  The women in lower organization 
levels of the work force need female managers and supervisors as role models.23 To deny Title 
VII protection to contra-power claims is to cede victory to the unequal workplace.   Further, to 
the extent that contra-power cases are “novel,” these cases provide an opportunity to examine the 
common assumptions underlying sexual harassment law.23a 
A contra-power harassment claim is limited to a hostile environment claim in that 
subordinates do not have the power to grant or deny tangible employment benefits.24 Two of the 
elements of a hostile environment claim require special consideration.  First, a plaintiff must 
prove that the behavior at issue is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to affect a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment.25 An analysis of the case law shows that courts are 
downplaying the severity of behavior when the victim of the harassment is a supervisor.26 I
argue that courts should not consider the organizational relationship of the target and the harasser 
when deciding if the workplace has been rendered hostile.27 By doing so, the courts are ignoring 
the importance of sociocultural power which allows lower-status men to harass women at 
work.27a By exercising their societal power, men are able to harass their supervisors and to affect 
the terms or conditions of women’s employment.     
However, the organizational relationship is important for determining employer liability.  
The standard to hold the employer liable for harassment by its employees turns on the 
organizational status of the harasser and the employer’s response to the harassment.  Briefly, an 
employer is vicariously liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor but maintains the 
ability to prove an affirmative defense.28 If co-workers have created the hostile environment, the 
 
22 Diane M. Martin, Humor in Middle Management: Women Negotiating the Paradoxes of Organizational Life, 32 J. 
APPLIED COMM. RES. 147, 148-49 (2004). 
23 One social science article indicates that a higher presence of female supervisors and managers decreases the 
incidence of sexual harassment.  See Myrtle P. Bell, Mary E. McLaughlin & Jennifer M. Sequeira, Discrimination, 
Harassment, and the Glass Ceiling: Women Executives as Change Agents, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 65, 69 (2002).  See 
also James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Sociocultural, 
Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67 SOC. SCI. Q. 814, 824 (1986) (noting that more integrated, less 
sexualized work environments would encourage more assertive responses to sexual harassment). 
23a See Pat K. Chew and Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 49 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
49, 71 (2006) (discussing “novel” fact patterns, including contra-power, in racial harassment cases). 
24 The five elements of a hostile environment claim have generally been accepted as: (1) the employee belongs to a 
protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of 
was based upon sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment; and 
(5) respondeat superior: the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take 
prompt remedial action.  Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982).  See also EEOC 
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2006).   
25 Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.   
26 See infra notes 203-216 and accompanying text (discussing cases where courts recognized presence of sexually 
explicit behavior or comments, yet determined conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive).   
27 For a further discussion of the organization power model proposed by social science researchers to explain sexual 
harassment and its inadequacies, see infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.   
27a Other commentators have called upon the courts to consider the informal power dynamics of the workplace.  
Susan Carle’s recent piece argues that courts have argued these informal power dynamics to classify more harassers 
as co-workers than should be rightly so considered.  See Susan D. Carle, Acknowledging Informal Power Dynamics 
in the Workplace: A Proposal for Further Development of the Vicarious Liability Doctrine in Hostile Environment 
Sexual Harassment Cases, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 85 (Spring 2006). 
28 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 
(1998).  See infra Part V for an in-depth discussion of the employer liability standard. 
5employer is liable under a negligence standard, i.e., the employer is liable for failure to take 
prompt remedial action to correct that behavior of which it has knowledge.29 I argue that a 
negligence standard is the appropriate standard for contra-power harassment claims.  In applying 
this standard, courts should not presume that women who have risen to the rank of supervisors 
are incapable of choosing to exercise their power simply by virtue of their status as women.  
However, courts should not require the supervisor-target to exercise discipline preemptively.  
Other targets of sexual harassment are not required to engage in self-help remedies.  In other 
cases of sexual harassment, a complaint of sexual harassment puts the employer on notice.  
There is no compelling reason to create a different rule here.  Supervisors should be penalized 
for failing to exercise power only when the employer explicitly authorizes the exercise of such 
power.   
 This article proceeds accordingly.  In Part I, I describe the social science research into 
contra-power harassment.  Part IA discusses the prevalence of contra-power harassment, Part IB 
describes the behaviors which make up contra-power harassment, and Part IC sets forth the 
responses by victims of sexual harassment, both traditional and contra-power.  With the 
empirical evidence in place, I then turn to the theoretical constructs of contra-power harassment.  
In Part IIA, I set forth the four models of power that give rise to sexual harassment: 
organizational; social-cultural; sex-role spillover and natural/biological.  In Part IIB, I review the 
legal scholarship defining harassment as discrimination “because of sex.”  Part III describes 
contra-power harassment cases that have reached the courts. 
 Next, I discuss the creation of the contra-power harassment claim.  Part IV deals with the 
first four elements of a contra-power harassment claim.  Part IVA addresses “protected class.”  
Part IVB deals with the unwelcome requirement.  Part IVC takes on the “because of sex” 
requirement.  Part IVD addresses the severe or pervasive requirement.  Part V addresses the 
difficult question of employer liability.  Each part considers the courts’ current holdings on these 
elements and makes suggested changes.  A brief conclusion follows. 
 
I.   The Social Science of Contra-power Harassment 
 
In the social science arena, Katherine Benson is generally credited with coining the term 
“contra-power harassment.”30 Responding to an article describing university definitions of 
sexual harassment, Benson criticized definitions that refused to label behavior as harassing 
unless the victim had less formal power than the abuser.31 She discussed contra-power 
harassment as occurring when the victim has formal power over the abuser.32 She argued that 
the power relation that is essential to sexual harassment is not the formal, organizational power 
relationship but rather the relation that exists between men and women in society.33 In doing so, 
she set into motion a multitude of social science research studies. 
 
A.  The Prevalence of Contra-power Harassment
29 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. 
30 See Katherine A. Benson, Comment on Crocker’s “An Analysis of University Definitions of Sexual Harassment,”
9 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 516, 517 (1984). 
31 Id. at 519. 
32 Id. at 517. 
33 Id. at 518. 
6It has become common knowledge that sexual harassment is a widespread problem.  The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) receives more than 13,000 formal 
complaints each year.34 The number of formal charges is up five-fold from the late 1980s.35 
One study of federal employees found 44% of women and 19% of men experienced harassing 
behavior in the previous two years.36 The National Association for Female Executives found 
that 53% of its membership was sexually harassed or knew someone who was.37 Over 60% of 
Working Woman’s magazine readers reported having been sexually harassed at work and more 
than one third of those readers knew a co-worker who was harassed.38 
The least common form of harassment reported is contra-power harassment.  According 
to the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 10-16% of men and 2-4% of women who report 
being harassed report being harassed by subordinates.39 Another study reported that women 
experienced harassment from subordinates in 8% of the harassment incidents.40 It bears noting 
that one explanation for the low number of reported incidences of contra-power harassment of 
women is that women do not occupy supervisory positions in the same magnitude as men.  
According to a recent report by the EEOC, women represent 48% of the workforce but represent 
only 36% of officials and managers.41 In addition, women are more likely than men to have an 
opposite-sex supervisor.42 Further, women with higher education levels are the most vulnerable 
to contra-power harassment, in part because more men comprise their subordinates, but also 
because “their gender was also likely to be particularly salient under such circumstances.”43 
Despite low reporting rates, contra-power harassment is prevalent across professions and 
job categories.  One female executive noted that “the higher up you climb, the worse the 
harassment gets.”44 In one study, 77% of female family physicians reported having been 
sexually harassed by patients.45 Three studies indicated that between 34% and 39% of all female 
 
34 EEOC, Sexual Harassment Charges, http://eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2006). 
35 See Bell et al., supra note 23, at 67; McKinney, supra note 16, at 424.  
36 U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. (USMSPB), REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 13 (1995). 
37 Michele Galen, Joseph Weber & Alice Z. Cuneo, Sexual Harassment: Out of the Shadows, BUS. WK., Oct. 28, 
1991, at 30, 31. 
38 Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment: The Inside Story, WORKING WOMAN, Jun. 1992, at 47, 48. 
39 USMSPB, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: UPDATE  20 (1988).  See also USMSPB, supra 
note 36, at 19.  
40 Cathy L. Z. DuBois, Deborah E. Knapp, Robert H. Faley & Gary A. Kustis, An Empirical Examination of Same- 
and Other-Gender Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 39 SEX ROLES 731, 739 (1998) (Women were most often 
harassed by someone with greater organizational power (51%) followed by co-worker (41%) and rarely by 
subordinate (8%).  Further, men were most often harassed by co-workers (56%) followed by subordinate (31%) and 
least often by someone at higher level (14%)).   A study of racial harassment cases found contra-power cases to 
account for 3.1% of the cases studied.  See Chew and Kelley, supra note 23a, at 72.  
41 EEOC, Glass Ceilings: The Status of Women as Officials and Managers in the Private Sector,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/glassceiling/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2006).  See also Bell et al., supra note 
6, at 65 (women occupy only 30% of all salaried manager positions, 20% of middle manager positions and about 5% 
of executive level positions); Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual 
Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 55, 57 (1982) (41% of women in study reported that they 
supervised others as compared to 61% of men). 
42 Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 57. 
43 Colleen O’Connell & Karen Korabik, Sexual Harassment: The Relationship of Personal Vulnerability, Work 
Context, Perpetrator Status, and Type of Harassment to Outcomes, 56 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 299, 320 (2000). 
44 Bell et al., supra note 23, at 70. 
45 Schneider & Phillips, supra note 16, at 669. 
7attorneys reported being sexually harassed by a client in the last five years.46 A study of 
academia found that 30% of male faculty and 24% of female faculty were targets of uninvited 
sexual comments from students as often as four times per month.47 Another study of workplace 
aggression found that 20% of the “institigators” of bullying are of lower institutional status than 
the targets.47a 
As with other forms of harassment, contra-power harassment is most likely to occur when 
the employer has created a workplace in which the harassers feel free to harass.  Two of the 
strongest risk factors for harassment are an unprofessional atmosphere and the existence of sexist 
attitudes.48 
B.  Behaviors
So what type of behavior constitutes contra-power harassment?  The most common forms 
of contra-power harassment, according to one study, are unwanted sexual teasing, jokes, remarks 
or questions.49 One study of female physicians revealed that 77% of female doctors have been 
harassed by a patient, 26% reported feeling frightened by the sexual behavior of their male 
patients,50 and they commonly experienced sexist comments and sexualized interactions.51 In 
addition, female physicians are groped, asked to do unnecessary genital exams, sent sex-related 
letters and objects, and some are assaulted.52 
In the academic setting, female professors reported experiencing undue attention, verbal 
sexist comments, written sexual comments, physical advances, explicit sexual propositions, 
sexual bribery, sexual assault and obscene phone calls.53 In addition, students possess some 
power in that they evaluate faculty.  The evaluations are anonymous, creating the perfect vehicle 
for a harasser to undermine a professor, possibly affecting her career, with comments about her 
body and sexuality without facing consequences.54 Students may draw explicit pictures or write 
comments on the evaluation that could be considered sexually harassing.55 
46 Frank Clancy, When Customer Service Crosses the Line, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1994, at 36, 38.  
There is an interesting question here as to whether harassment by a client should be considered contra-power 
harassment.  Although the general perception may be that the attorney is able to “fire” the client and thus holds the 
power, in many situations the client may hold the greater power.  Imagine the situation of a newly hired female 
associate and the long-established client of a firm, or the solo practitioner trying to establish her practice.  In some 
instances the label of contra-power harassment will not fit the facts of harassment from clients. 
47 Matchen & DeSouza, supra note 16, at 297; McKinney, supra note 16, at 425. 
47a David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile 
Environment Protection, 88 GEORGETOWN L. J. 475, 481 (March 2000) (citing Christine M. Pearson, Incivility and 
Aggression at Work: Executive Summary (July 1998) (on file with David Yamada). 
48 Elizabeth O’Hare & William O’Donohue, Sexual Harassment: Identifying Risk Factors, 27 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 561, 576 (1998). 
49 Sandra S. Tangri, Martha R. Burt & Leanor B. Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models,
38 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 46 (1982).  This is true regardless of the sex of the victim or the status of the harasser.  See 
also USMSPB, supra note 36, at 14 (noting most commonly reported form of sexual harassment is “unwanted 
sexual teasing, jokes, remarks or questions”). 
50 Susan P. Phillips & Margaret Schneider, Sexual Harassment of Female Doctors by Patients, 329 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1936 (1993).  
51 Schneider & Phillips, supra note 16, at 670. 
52 Id. 
53 Grauerholz, supra note 16, at 793. 
54 Id. at 790. 
55 Id.
8Women faculty can be harassed in subtler or more indirect ways that may “punish” the 
instructor for acting outside of her traditional gender role.56 Students spread rumors, intimidate 
women professors, and make sexist or sexual comments, physical advances and obscene phone 
calls that request sex or mention the professor’s sexual attractiveness.57 Typically, the harasser is 
a male student.58 This type of sexual harassment is rarely reported and is frequently attributed to 
ignorance, stupidity or awkwardness, which allows students to get by with direct and obvious 
behaviors.59 
C.  Responses to Contra-power Harassment
Sexual harassment has a wide variety of impacts on the workplace and the individuals 
involved.  In addition to the emotional effects of sexual harassment, women find that their 
careers are interrupted.60 “Women may . . . experience lower productivity, less job satisfaction, 
reduced self-confidence, and a loss of motivation and commitment to their work and their 
employer.”61 
Despite the prevalence of sexual harassment, most victims of sexual harassment do not 
formally report the harassment.62 Only 26% of the Working Woman readers who admitted being 
harassed formally reported it.63 Social scientists believe victims do not report what happened to 
them because they fear repercussions, are embarrassed to report the incident, feel shameful about 
what happened, or do not believe that what they experienced qualifies as sexual harassment.64 
Instead, common responses to sexual harassment are to ignore the behavior or to engage in 
denial.65 In addition, many women will quit rather than face the harassment.66 Although sexual 
harassment has received increased attention, report rates appear to remain low.  Initial 
 
56 Id. at 799.   See also Jeanette N. Cleveland & Melinda E. Kerst, Sexual Harassment and Perceptions of Power: An 
Under-Articulated Relationship, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 49, 58 (1993) (“The goal of the abuser in contra-power 
harassment is often to devalue the woman by highlighting the traditional gender stereotype (i.e., helplessness, 
incompetence, passivity) over her work role.”); Kathleen McKinney, supra note 16, at 423 (“[I]t is argued . . . that 
due to the status inconsistency (i.e., female and college faculty), offenders may not view a woman faculty member’s 
achieved status as legitimate or important.”); Matchen & DeSouza, supra note 16, at 296 (“[I]n the patriarchal U.S. 
society, contra-power sexual harassment may function to reinforce the gender status of female faculty and to 
increase the power of organizational subordinates (male students), who often go unpunished.”). 
57 McKinney, supra note 16, at 431-32.  See also Grauerholz, supra note 16, at 799. 
58 Grauerholz, supra note 16, at 795-96. 
59 Id. at 799. 
60 Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES & ANSWERS 50, 
56 (Linda LeMoncheck & James P. Sterba eds., 2001).  
61 Id.
62 See Bell et al., supra note 23, at 67 (noting that “most sexual harassment targets do not file formal charges”); 
McKinney, supra note 16, at 424 (noting that “most harassment is not reported to formal social control agents”); 
Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and 
Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 117, 121 (1995). 
63 Sandroff, supra note 38, at 47. 
64 Eric L. Dey, Jessica S. Korn & Linda J. Sax, Betrayed by the Academy: The Sexual Harassment of Women 
College Faculty, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 149, 150 (1996); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 62, at 122 (noting that most 
common reason for non-reporting is fear). 
65 Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 59 (“Two of the most common reactions that women have to sexual 
harassment are denial and to ignore the incident.”). 
66 O’Connell & Korabik, supra note 43, at 304 (citing studies); Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual 
Harassment at Work in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES and ANSWERS 50, 56 (LeMoncheck & Sterba eds. 2001) 
(“Up to ten percent of women have quit a job because of sexual harassment).   
9information suggested that report rates were on the rise in the early to mid-1990s.67 For 
example, the National Association of Working Women hotline received triple the usual number 
of calls in a week in 199168 and the number of charges filed with the EEOC increased five-fold 
from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.69 However, after this initial jump in EEOC charges, the 
rate leveled off and has begun to decline in recent years.70 Moreover, social science studies 
continue to find low report rates.  A 1995 study of Navy officers and enlisted members found 
that only 8% of enlisted women and 6% of women officers filed grievances.71 Even when the 
informal practice of reporting behavior to an authority (as opposed to filing a formal grievance) 
is considered, fewer than 25% of women who had been harassed reported the behavior.72 More 
recent social science studies have attempted to investigate determinants and precursors of 
reporting, as well as classify how targets respond to sexual harassment, in order to better 
understand why targets do not report sexual harassment.73 
As harassing behaviors are not always clearly sexual harassment, some victims may be 
hesitant to report the behaviors because they are not sure if what they experienced is indeed 
sexual harassment.  Men and women interpret behaviors differently.74 In one study, men 
believed that women harassed by persons of lower status would be more upset than men harassed 
by such persons.75 However, women believed that both men and women would be equally upset.  
“[W]omen see harassing behaviors negatively.”76 Although the most commonly experienced 
harassing behaviors reported were unwanted sexual teasing, jokes, remarks or questions,77 a 
victim may feel as if she is over-reacting if she reports it and may choose to suffer in silence 
instead.  In some studies, the hierarchical level of the harasser significantly influenced 
perceptions of “less severe” forms of harassment such as gender harassment and seductive 
behavior but had no impact on perceptions of sexual bribery, coercion or assault.78 In fact, the 
higher the organizational status of the harasser, the more likely the target is to acknowledge 
being harassed.79 Targets of contra-power harassment, then, would be the least likely to 
acknowledge being harassed. 
 
67 See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 23, at 67; Sandroff, supra note 38, at 49. 
68 Galen, supra note 37, at 31. 
69 Bell et al., supra note 23, at 67. 
70 EEOC, supra note 34. 
71 Carol E. Newell, Paul Rosenfeld & Amy L. Culbertson, Sexual Harassment Experiences and Equal Opportunity 
Perceptions of Navy Women, 32 SEX ROLES 159, 161 (1995). 
72 Sandy Welsh & James E. Gruber, Not Taking It Any More: Women Who Report or File Complaints of Sexual 
Harassment, 36 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 559 (1999) (summarizing studies of report rates). 
73 See, e.g., Caren B. Goldberg, The Impact of the Proportion of Women in One’s Workgroup, Profession, and 
Friendship Circle on Males’ and Females’ Responses to Sexual Harassment, 45 SEX ROLES 359 (2001); Deborah 
Erdos Knapp, Robert H. Faley, Steven E. Ekeberg & Cathy L. Z. Dubois, Determinants of Target Responses to 
Sexual Harassment: A Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 687 (1997); Amy J. Marin & Rosanna E. 
Guadagno, Perceptions of Sexual Harassment Victims as a Function of Labeling and Reporting, 41 SEX ROLES 921 
(1999). 
74 Grauerholz, supra note 16, at 798 (“Women’s perception and awareness of sexual harassment, even by male 
students, also reflect women’s experience in a culture in which coercive sexuality is wide spread.”). 
75 Kathleen McKinney, Contrapower Sexual Harassment: The Effects of Student Sex and Type of Behavior of 
Faculty Perceptions, 27 SEX ROLES 627, 640 (1992). 
76 Bell et al., supra note 23, at 70.   
77 USMSPB, supra note 36, at 14. 
78 Moore, supra note 16, at 18-19. 
79 Theresa M. Beiner, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 161 (2005). 
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The dynamics of contra-power harassment make the fears associated with reporting the 
incidents different from sexual harassment initiated by a supervisor or co-worker.  Supervisors 
face different repercussions than subordinates in reporting sexual harassment.  Supervisors’ 
ability to successfully manage their subordinates may be called into question.80 Some female 
supervisors have suggested, in conversations with their colleagues, they do not want to be 
perceived as a bitch and want to be considered “one of the guys.”81 For male supervisors, 
reporting sexual harassment carries the added disincentives of fear of public exposure and 
perceived weakness as a superior or as a man, and the threat of being perceived as, or accused of, 
being the initiator of the harassment.82 
II. Background of Contra-power 
 
A.  Models of Power
Sexual harassment is traditionally defined as an abuse of power made possible by the 
power inequalities between men and women.83 In the workplace, men historically have power 
over women by a result of their higher organizational positions and, thus, are able to abuse that 
power to harass women.  This traditional definition does not account for harassment by co-
workers or for contra-power harassment.  To understand how and why contra-power harassment 
occurs, it is useful to explain the various models of power proposed by social science 
researchers.84 
The first model is the organizational power model.85 Many researchers suggest that the 
legal system’s definition of sexual harassment is premised upon this model.86 Under this model, 
harassment is most likely to occur when the harasser has a higher place in the workplace 
hierarchy than the victim.87 “[S]exual harassment is the result of certain opportunity structures 
 
80 Moore, supra note 16, at 7, 42 (stating that superiors may be hesitant to sanction behavior because “the use of 
formal sanctions to bring about cooperation is perceived as poor leadership”).  See also infra Part VD(1) (suggesting 
that female supervisor’s hesitancy in reporting contra-power harassment stems from desire to maintain appearance 
of effective managerial control). 
81 Martin, supra note 22, at 158. 
82 Moore, supra note 16, at 42-43. 
83 See Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment in European, German, and U.S. 
Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 582, 590 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2004); Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 56. 
84 Social science has not come to a consensus on the number of models used to explain sexual harassment.  See, e.g.,
Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 34 (describing three “broad models” as natural or biological, organizational, and 
sociocultural); Greetje Timmerman, Sexual Harassment of Adolescents Perpetrated by Teachers and by Peers: An 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Power, Culture, and Gender in Secondary Schools, 48 SEX ROLES 231, 232 (2003) 
(discussing harassment in secondary schools and describing “a number of theories”); Gary L. Whaley & Shirley H. 
Tucker, A Theoretical Integration of Sexual Harassment Models, 17 EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES INT’L 21, 21-22 (1998) 
(describing four models: sociocultural, organizational, individual differences, and nature/biology).  For a more in-
depth account of the social science behind these various models, see Beiner, supra note 79, 114-125 (describing four 
models). 
85 See Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 50-52; Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 56-57; Rospenda et al., 
supra note 16, at 41-44; Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 37-40; Timmerman, supra note 84, at 232-33; Wayne, supra 
note 16, at 303-10; Whaley & Tucker, supra note 84, at 21. 
86 See, e.g., Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 41. 
87 Wayne, supra note 16, at 302. 
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created by organizational climate, hierarchy, and specific authority relations.”88 Under the 
organizational model, women may harass men who are lower on the flowchart.89 Some research 
has provided a more nuanced view of the organizational power model by examining certain 
structural aspects of the workplace.90 For example, the ratio of men to women in the workplace, 
as well as the hierarchical positions of men, is a relevant factor to determine whether harassment 
will occur.91 Regardless of what nuances are added to the model, it is dependent upon the 
concept of organizational hierarchy.92 Thus, this model cannot account for the widespread 
occurrences of co-worker harassment or for contra-power harassment.  In my review of the 
social science literature, I found few researchers who supported the organizational model.93 
A second model is the sociocultural model.  This model explains sexual harassment as 
the result of “societal norms or cultural patterns that promote superiority of some groups (e.g., . . 
. males) over other groups (e.g., . . . women).”94 The patriarchal system privileges men and 
provides them with the power to harass women in the workplace.95 Thus, sexual harassment is 
more likely to occur when someone has societal power over another person and “reflects the 
larger society’s differential distribution of power and status between the sexes.”96 This model 
explains any type of harassment in which men harass women including co-worker and contra-
power but fails to explain women harassing men.97 
A third model integrates the previous models.  The sex-role spillover model explains 
sexual harassment as the result of sex roles being asserted over work roles.98 In addition, another 
set of social science researchers added a consideration of interpersonal power to the sociocultural 
power and organizational power.  By doing this, they attempt to address the importance of 
sources of power within the workplace that derive from sources other than hierarchical position, 
 
88 Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 34. 
89 However, under the organizational model, men are still the more likely harassers because of the positions they 
hold: in one study, 41% of women supervised others as opposed to 61% of men; moreover 43% of women had an 
opposite-sex supervisor whereas 7% of men had an opposite-sex supervisor.  Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 
56. 
90 See Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 43-49; Wayne, supra note 16, at 303-10. 
91 Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 37.  The difference in hierarchical positions is one factor leading to harassment.  
Research has also examined the sex ratio of the workplace, the sex ratio of the occupation, occupational norms, job 
function and availability of grievance procedures and job alternatives.  See Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 42 
(collecting studies). 
92 Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 43 (“Organizational models underestimate the importance of gender and other 
social characteristics in structuring access to organizational power.”). 
93 See, e.g., Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 57 (“[O]ur data does not provide much support for [this] 
perspective.”); Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 43 (stating that organizational models assume that organizations 
are gender neutral and “underestimate the importance of gender . . . in structuring access to [] power.”). 
94 Wayne, supra note 16, at 303.  The sociocultural model is also called the societal power model. See Cleveland & 
Kerst, supra note 56, at 50. 
95 Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 40.   
96 Id. at 34.  See also Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 41 (“[S]exual harassment emanates from power differences 
between men and women at the sociocultural level and functions to maintain those differences at the organizational 
level.”). 
97 Rospenda et al. suggest that the sociocultural model is limited in its ability to account for female-on-male 
harassment as well as same-sex harassment.  These non-traditional forms of harassment are not explained under this 
theory because the model does not account for the confluence of gender, race and class.  However, it may explain 
same-sex harassment to the extent that the victim of the harassment is someone perceived to have less social power, 
such as a gay or lesbian employee.  See Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 43-44. 
98 See Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 58. 
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such as access to resources.99 This model specifically addresses contra-power harassment and 
argues that male subordinates harass women supervisors to counteract or equalize power 
differentials with women supervisors.100 Thus, acts of contra-power harassment reinforce the 
inferior gender status of women by negating their higher organizational status.101 Deborah 
Tannen has described contra-power harassment as a “frequent form of insubordination 
perpetrated against those above them in a hierarchy.”101a 
The final model is the natural/biological model which explains sexual harassment as a 
natural outcome of the difference in sexual drives between men and women.102 Termed 
“somewhat simplistic” by one social science article,103 this model asserts that sexual harassment 
is a “natural expression of sexual attraction and that men and women are naturally attracted to 
each other.”104 Further, this model rests on the inner drive of men to be sexually aggressive and 
therefore places no blame or bad intent on the harasser.105 Men are simply seeking to maximize 
reproductive sex.106 This model, of course, does not explain women harassing men (unless the 
women are seeking the security of male economic support for their offspring) and does not 
explain same-sex harassment.107 
Of the four models described, two - the sociocultural and the integrated models - provide 
an excellent account for the occurrence of contra-power harassment.  Women with power may be 
seen as a threat to men either economically or to their self-esteem.108 The goal of the harasser is 
to devalue the higher organizational status of women “by highlighting the traditional gender 
stereotype . . . over her work role.”109 It is a tactic to gain power - social power - over female 
supervisors.  Women who deviate from their ascribed roles by obtaining power are then punished 
with harassing behavior. 
 
B.  Conceptions of Harassment as Discrimination
If social science provides the theoretical basis of the “why,” “how” and “to whom” of 
contra-power harassment, how have legal scholars addressed the issue?  The short answer is: 
they have not.  Apart from a few references acknowledging the existence of contra-power 
harassment, it is not discussed in legal literature.110 Despite ignoring contra-power harassment, 
 
99 Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 52-53.   
100 Id. at 58. 
101 Id.
101a Deborah Tannen, What’s Sex Got to Do With It? In SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 85, 86 
(LeMoncheck & Sterba eds. 2001). 
102 Some social science researchers who take great pains to explain the other three models do not mention the 
natural/biological model.  See, e.g., Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 50-54; Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41; 
Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 41-44; Wayne, supra note 16, at 303-12. 
103 Whaley & Tucker, supra note 84, at 22. 
104 Id.
105 This model tends to “trivialise [sic] sexual harassment as normal and harmless and as the result of the behavior of 
a few ‘sick’ proclivities of a minority of men.”  Id.
106 Beiner, supra note 79, at 122. 
107 For a compelling dissection of the support for the natural/biological model, see Beiner, supra note 79, at 121-125. 
108 See Whaley & Tucker, supra note 84, at 26. 
109 Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 58. 
110 Contra-power harassment is mentioned or discussed in eleven law review articles.  Only Vicki Schultz has 
discussed the concept in more than passing, and her discussion consists of only a few sentences.  See Schultz, supra 
note 16, at 1767 & n.444 (“[W]omen higher-ups also confront challenges to their power and efforts to subvert their 
performance by male subordinates.”).  Professor Schultz discusses contra-power harassment, which she refers to as 
“bottom-up harassment,” in the context of her theory to reconceptualize sexual harassment as behavior that seeks to 
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legal scholars have addressed the question of why sexual harassment should be considered 
discrimination because of sex.  Although these theories were not designed to encompass contra-
power harassment, each supports the argument that Title VII should protect against the 
harassment of supervisors by subordinates.  
In the late 1990s, the rise of same-sex harassment cases catalyzed scholars to return to the 
fundamental question of “what’s wrong with sexual harassment?”111 How can “because of sex” 
be interpreted in a principled way so as to prohibit harassment against women while also 
protecting men from same-sex harassment?112 A fascinating dialogue developed within legal 
 
undermine women’s competence in the workplace.  Id. Her theory would encompass claims of contra-power 
harassment.  See infra notes 138-148 and accompanying text.  Six other articles briefly mention contra-power 
harassment in passing.  See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 72 (2006) (reviewing findings of empirical study on racial harassment cases and describing 
“contra-power harassment” as “novel fact pattern” appearing where “power status of the parties is reversed”); Anna-
Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies,
39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 102-03 (2005) (noting that one common management practice which creates obstacles for 
women seeking protection under grievance procedures is interpretation of procedures to exempt certain categories of 
harassment, with one such category being “same-sex contra-power harassment”); Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael 
Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 HOUS.
L. REV. 1517, 1544 & n.142 (1995) (noting that harassment “may occur at all levels within an organization, so that 
women and minorities in managerial level positions may become targets of harassment by superiors and 
subordinates alike” and citing social science article identifying such behavior as “contra-power harassment”); Vicki 
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2146 n.349 (2003) (discussing contra-power harassment in 
footnote); Rachel L. Toker, Note, Multiple Masculinities: A New Vision for Same-Sex Harassment Law, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 577, 588-89 (1999) (discussing Professor Schultz’s theory of sexual harassment and its 
encompassing of contra-power harassment); Rachel Mead Zweighaft, Comment, What’s the Harm? The Legal 
Accommodation of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 434, 437 n.12 (1997) (“[F]emale 
supervisors sometimes are harassed by men in lower positions.  This phenomenon is called ‘contra-power 
harassment.’”).  The remaining four articles merely cite to a social science article that has the term in the title.  See 
Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing 
Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 294 n.133 (2001) (citing social 
science article with “contra-power” in title for proposition that there is limited research examining “interaction of 
sexual harassment with race, ethnicity and socio-economic status”); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, A Critical Race 
Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1235, 1242 n.24 (2006) (citing social science article with “contra-power” in title for proposition concerning 
responses to sexual harassment); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual 
Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 192 n.45 (2001) (citing social science article 
with “contra-power” in title for proposition concerning responses to sexual harassment); Richard L. Wiener & Linda 
E. Hurt, Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do Workers Know When It Is Sexual Harassment and When It Is 
Not?, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 53, 66 n.74 (1997) (citing social science article with “contra-power” in title in string cite 
of articles for assertion that men and women workers differ in their views of what behavior constitutes sexual 
harassment).  
111 See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 691-98 (1997).  
Franke argues that because of the increasing severity and doctrinal complexity of the sexual harassment problem, the 
time has come to readdress the question of why sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination.  Id. at 691.
Franke explains that neither the Supreme Court nor the principal theoretical arguments advanced by feminist 
scholars sufficiently answer the question of why workplace sexual harassment justifies a Title VII cause of action 
for discrimination “on the basis of sex.”  Id. at 693. The three fundamental feminist rationales she rejects are that 
sexual harassment is (1) conduct that would not have occurred but for the plaintiff’s sex, id. at 705-14; (2) conduct 
that violates Title VII specifically because it is sexual in nature, id. at 714-25; and (3) conduct that sexually 
subordinates women to men, id. at 725-29.  
112 Same-sex harassment disproportionately affects men.  See USMSPB, supra note 36. The report’s main 
informational source is a survey questionnaire sent in April 1994 to almost 13,200 federal employees, to which over 
61% (8000 people) responded voluntarily and anonymously.  Id. at 1-2.  The study states that from among those 
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academia over how to interpret Title VII.113 Each voice in the discussion critiqued the current 
approaches utilized by the courts.  For example, courts had employed a “but for” test under 
which courts sought to determine whether the complained of behavior would have occurred “but 
for” the victim’s sex.114 In addition, some courts have focused primarily on the sexualized 
nature of the behavior, thereby finding behavior that is not overtly sexual to be irrelevant.115 
Theorists agree that sexual harassment causes harm but have approached the wrong of 
sexual harassment with different foci.  Some theorists wish to keep the focus on harassment 
against women at work while bringing claims of same-sex harassment in on the margins.116 
Others view the wrong of harassment as equally impacting men and women.117 A summary of 
these theories follows and includes a description of how contra-power harassment fits within 
each.118 
1.  Bernstein’s Respectful Person Standard 
Anita Bernstein places sexual harassment as a wrong somewhere between a Title VII 
violation and a workplace tort.119 She argues that hostile environment sexual harassment is a 
type of disrespect.120 A hostile environment plaintiff must prove both that she subjectively 
perceived her environment to be hostile and that the environment was objectively hostile or 
abusive.121 Bernstein takes issue with the reasonableness test employed by courts to determine 
the objective element - whether it is a reasonable person, reasonable woman or any other 
formulation.122 She advocates the adoption of the “respectful person” standard because sexual 
 
who had experienced unwanted sexual attention (44% of women and 19% of men responding to the survey), only 
1% of female victims said they were sexually harassed by another woman or women, while 21% of male victims 
reported being harassed by another man or men.  Id. at 18.        
113 For a useful summary of this discussion, see Jaimie Leeser, Note, The Causal Role of Sex in Sexual Harassment,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1750, 1772-78 (2003). 
114 See Franke, supra note 111, at 730-47.  Franke critiques the “but for” test, contending that “[i]n both the same- 
and different-sex contexts, this account fails to address why sexual harassment is a kind of sex discrimination.”  Id. 
at 730.  Franke further explains the “‘but for’ [approach] is an evidentiary short cut that Title VII plaintiffs may use 
in order to prove sex discrimination,” with its error arising “when the evidentiary methodology stands for, or worse, 
is understood to constitute the underlying wrong it is designed to prove.”  Id. at 730-31.  See infra Part IVC for a 
discussion of the decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. requiring comparative evidence for the “but 
for” test.   
115 See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1762-69 (describing various forms of such “less sexual” behavior in workplace and 
its weakening effect on both women’s work competence and sense of self-confidence as employee).    
116 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1225-29 
(1998). 
117 See, e.g., Franke, supra note 111, at 762-63 (“[T]he net effect of this kind of [harassing] conduct extends beyond 
any particular case in that it solidifies what ‘real men’ and ‘real women’ should be.  This dynamic affects all of us . . 
. .”). 
118 The articles I discuss below are deeply interesting and thought-provoking.  Due to page constraints and because 
my focus is different than an overarching theoretical perspective, these articles are unfortunately given short shrift 
here.  I encourage those who have not already done so to read the pieces in full. 
119 See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 448 (1997). 
120 See id. at 450-52 (explaining that term “respect” best illustrates what is wrong with creation and continuation of 
hostile working environment). 
121 Id. at 452-53. 
122 See id. at 464-82.  Bernstein explains that the reasonable person standard “provides neither gender neutrality nor 
meaningful content.”  Id. at 471.  In addition, the “failure of ‘reasonable women’ to improve on ‘reasonable person,’ 
the futility of continuing to tinker ad absurdum, and the perils of abandoning objectivity add up to a strong 
condemnation of any standard based on reasonableness.”  Id.  Thus, Bernstein concludes, it is the standard’s 
adjective, rather than the noun, that needs to be replaced.  Id.   
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harassment “betrays the ideal of recognition respect,” which is a sense of recognition of a 
person’s inherent worth that is owed to all persons.123 Under this standard, an employer has a 
“non-delegable duty to maintain an attitude of responsiveness and attention.”124 By focusing on 
the employer’s duty, Bernstein examines the behavior of the harasser as opposed to the harassed.  
Instead of asking whether the plaintiff welcomed such behavior, the respectful standard asks 
whether “the defendant behave[d] as a respectful person?”125 
Much of the behavior that constitutes contra-power harassment violates the duty of a 
respectful person.  Instinctively, a supervisor is accorded some measure of respect due to her 
position.  Bernstein refers to this as appraisal respect and defines it in part as “high or special 
regard: deferential regard as from a servant to his master: esteem.”126 Bernstein carefully 
grounds her theory of the respectful person not in appraisal respect but rather in recognition 
respect.  Under Kantian principles, recognition respect is owed to all persons as persons.127 
Conversely, appraisal respect is not owed to all, only to those to deserving of admiration.128 
Thus, Bernstein creates a theory where all persons should be treated with respect, not just those 
the majority of society has deemed worthy of respect.  Although one could argue that not all 
supervisors are deserving of appraisal respect, society expects supervisors to be treated with 
deference.129 In a sense, contra-power harassment violates both recognition respect by denying 
the inherent worth as a person and appraisal respect by denying the deferential regard arguably 
owed to all supervisors. 
 
2.  Franke’s Technology of Sexism 
Katherine Franke describes sexual harassment as a “technology of sexism” in which 
sexual harassment of a woman by a man “embodies fundamental gender stereotypes: men as 
sexual conquerors and women as sexually conquered.”130 Therefore, sexual harassment “is a 
form of sex discrimination when it reflects or perpetuates gender stereotypes in the 
workplace.”131 Sexual harassment of women perpetuates women’s roles as sexual objects and, 
therefore, it is discrimination “because of sex.”132 Franke seeks to provide a theoretical context 
 
123 Id. at 452.  Bernstein further explains that the ethical duty to render respect postulated in the concept of 
“recognition respect” is negative in nature.  Id. at 487.  This negative duty to “refrain from unjustified or cruel 
manifestations of disrespect” has three applications in the context of sexual harassment: recognition respects 
requires refraining from (1) treating another only as a means of achieving one’s own ends, (2) humiliating another, 
and (3) engaging in conduct that rejects or denies the personhood and self-conception of another.  Id.  
124 See id. at 495 (arguing that in order for respect to thrive in workplace, “respectful employer” must be seen as 
both agent and principal; thus, these responsibilities arise from employer’s own obligations not to promote or 
condone hostile workplace).    
125 Id. at 501 (“That is, did the defendant regard the complainant as a person, self-propelled and unique, with a range 
of potential reactions to sex-based conduct in the workplace?”). 
126 Id. at 484 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1934 (3d ed. 1981)).  
127 See id. at 483-84. 
128 See id. at 484. 
129 For an argument that the distinction between these two types of respect is not easy to maintain, see Abrams, 
supra note 116, at 1179.   
130 See Franke, supra note 111, at 693 (arguing that as “technology of sexism,” sexual harassment works as 
“disciplinary practice that inscribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both the harasser and victim according to 
a system of gender norms,” which effectively delineates women as “feminine sexual objects” and men as “masculine 
sexual subjects”).   
131 Id. at 696. 
132 See id. at 764-65 (noting that by reducing women subordinates in workplace to sex objects, sexual harassment 
effectively renders them “less competent and more sexual”). 
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from which to draw this inference.133 She focuses on the policing role of sexual harassment 
where harassment serves to keep gender non-conformists in line.134 Harassment discourages the 
woman who works in the shipyard, the man who will not play along with crude, vulgar horseplay 
or the man who is not considered “masculine enough.”135 Further, Franke notes that sexual 
harassment harms the harasser as well as the harassee by making the man a sexual aggressor.136 
Franke’s theory supports a claim for contra-power harassment.  Women deviate from 
their assigned gender roles when they enter non-traditional workplaces and when they seek to 
supervise other workers.  By holding power over workers, particularly over men, women have 
violated the societal norm of being passive, sexualized objects and thus must be brought back 
into line.  Harassment is the means utilized to return women to their rightful roles.  However, the 
harassment is not always in the form of sexualized behavior.  As Franke points out, not all 
offensive behavior directed at women is sexist behavior because not all is “because of sex.”137 
This may pose a particular evidentiary problem for contra-power harassment cases.  Workers 
often dislike their supervisors and engage in spiteful conduct.  The question for a court is 
whether the offensive conduct occurs “because of sex.”  Courts must remain vigilant to the 
hostility aimed at women supervisors and must consider whether that non-sexualized behavior is 
a means of gender regulation. 
 
3.  Schultz’s Competence-Centered Account 
Vicki Schultz criticizes current sexual harassment theory for placing sexuality - “more 
specifically, male-female sexual advances” - at the core of the problem.138 She argues that this 
desire-dominance paradigm “has served to exclude from legal understanding many of the most 
common and debilitating forms of harassment faced by women (and many men) at work each 
day.”139 In this way, the paradigm is underinclusive.  Schultz asserts that, in actuality, many of 
the most common forms of harassment seek to maintain work in general and, in particular, high 
prestige/highly compensated lines of work as “bastions of masculine competence and 
authority.”140 As examples of the types of non-sexualized behaviors that undermine women at 
work each day, she offers denigrating women’s performance, denying women the perks or 
privileges required for success, and deliberate work sabotage.141 Further, Schultz suggests that 
 
133 See id. at 762-66.  Franke builds her reconceptualization of sexual harassment as gender harassment on the theory 
of sexual harassment as a form of sexual subordination.  Id. at 762-63. Extending the subordination analysis to 
address the effect the concept’s underlying ideology has upon men, Franke argues that the wrong of gender-based 
subordination lies in its power as a regulatory agent with the dual goals of feminizing women and masculinizing 
men.  Id. at 763. Sexual harassment successfully achieves these “hetero-patriarchal objectives,” either by way of 
perpetuating gender norms (as in the traditional cases of men harassing female subordinates in the workplace) or by 
“punishing gender non-conformists.”  Id. at 763-66. 
134 See id. at 765-66 (explaining how sexual harassment disciplines gender deviants by enforcing “law of gender” 
that “insists that femininity is the only acceptable expression of femaleness, and that masculinity is the only 
acceptable expression of maleness”). 
135 Id. at 696.  
136 Id. at 763.  
137 See id. at 769.   
138 Schultz, supra note 16, at 1686. 
139 See id. at 1686-87 (noting that great deal “of the gender-based hostility and abuse” endured by women as well as 
men is “neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content”).  
140 Id. at 1687 (arguing that harassment must be viewed in context of job segregation).  
141 See id.  Schultz offers various other examples of non-sexualized harassment including withholding training, 
information, or opportunities for women to learn to execute their jobs well, engaging in pranks and taunting, and the 
isolation of women from the “social networks that confer a sense of belonging.”  Id.  While Schultz concedes that 
17
the prevailing paradigm emphasizes “protection of women’s sexual selves” over their 
empowerment as workers.142 In this way, the paradigm is overinclusive.  Not all sexual 
expression should be considered sexual harassment.  Rather, according to Schultz, the focus 
“should be on conduct that consigns people to gendered work roles that do not further their own 
aspirations or advantage.”143 
Schultz, similar to Franke, argues that harassment performs a “gender-guarding, 
competence-undermining function: By subverting women’s capacity to perform favored lines of 
work, harassment polices the boundaries of the work and protects its idealized masculine image--
as well as the identity of those who do it.”144 Thus, Schultz offers a competence-centered 
account of sexual harassment. 
Schultz incorporates same-sex harassment plaintiffs into her conception of sexual 
harassment by arguing that these plaintiffs are harassed because they “detract” from the 
workplace as an idealized masculine environment.145 Further, her theory is a means to 
“understand some less conventional forms of harassment, such as harassment of female 
supervisors by their male subordinates.”146 
Contra-power harassment is the quintessential example of Schultz’s reconceptualization 
of harassment because the presence of women as supervisors directly threatens the maintenance 
of the masculinity of the workplace.147 Any behavior directed at women seeking to undermine 
their competency as workers and supervisors should be actionable under Title VII.148 Thus, 
contra-power conduct that is not overtly sexual may or may not constitute actionable harassment.  
If discussions of sexual matters with a supervisor seek to undermine women and to secure the 
workplace for men, then Schultz’s theory would support the contra-power harassment claim.   
 
4.  Abrams’s Focus on Subordination  
Kathryn Abrams responds to the above theories with a call to retain the focus on the 
institutionalization of the subordination of women in the workplace.149 She argues that sexual 
harassment should be characterized “as a phenomenon that serves to preserve male control and 
entrench masculine norms in the workplace . . . .”150 Thus, the subordination of women should 
remain at the center of sexual harassment analyses.  Abrams describes the harms of sexual 
 
making a woman the target of sexual attention can undermine her image and self-confidence as a worker, she alleges 
that often harassment occurs in a manner that has “little or nothing to do with sexuality but everything to do with 
gender.”  Id.   
142 See id. at 1689 (arguing that doing so allows companies to interpret law as proscribing certain forms of “sexual 
expression that do not promote gender hierarchy at work”).   
143 Id. 
144 See id. at 1691.  “By protecting their jobs from incursion by women, or by incorporating women only on inferior 
terms, men sustain the impression that their work requires uniquely masculine skills.  Maintaining their jobs as 
repositories of masculine mastery, in turn, assures men a sense of identity (even superiority) as men.”  Id.   
145 See id. (explaining that similar to male workers who seek to protect their jobs from encroachment by women, “so 
too may male workers seek to denigrate and drive away other men who detract from the perception of their jobs as 
the embodiment of an idealized manly competence”). 
146 Id. at 1755.   
147 See id. at 1767 (noting that as response to such threat, male subordinates may confront “women higher-ups” with 
challenges to their power and efforts to sabotage their performance, as “many men have particular difficulty 
submitting to the authority of a female boss”). 
148 Id. at 1762. 
149 See Abrams, supra note 116, at 1171.   
150 Id. at 1172. 
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harassment as an interference with human agency.151 She brings many same-sex harassment 
claims within her account by discussing the “traditionally male prerogative for initiating sex in a 
range of contexts and without particular reference to the desires of the target.”152 Thus, the 
unilateral imposition of desire makes conduct actionable without regard to the sex of the victim 
and the harasser. 
Abrams critiques both Franke and Bernstein for departing from the focus on the 
subordination of women and Franke for explicitly rejecting the subordination-centered account 
of sexual harassment.153 Abrams faults Bernstein’s respectful person standard as obscuring the 
“gendered context and meaning of the conduct.”154 Abrams argues that Bernstein has 
“depoliticized” and “neutered” the wrong of sexual harassment by failing to conceptualize sexual 
harassment as a wrong that occurs in the workplace.155 According to Abrams, Bernstein has 
diminished the completeness of her account of sexual harassment.156 Further, Bernstein does not 
center her conceptualization of sexual harassment in the gender hierarchy of the workplace.157 
Abrams argues that it is of central importance that sexual harassment is perpetrated by the more 
powerful members of the hierarchy on the less powerful.158 By individualizing the harm, 
 
151 See id. at 1217-20.  Abrams argues that the ultimate harm of sexual harassment “relates both to the workplace as 
an institution” and to the workers within it.  Id. at 1219.  Further, Abrams claims that sexual harassment works to 
maintain the workplace as a “site of male control, where gender hierarchy is the order of the day and masculine 
norms structure the working environment.”  Id.  What she alleges to be of such grave concern is not merely that 
sexual harassment fortifies sex and gender hierarchy in any institution, but that it does so “in an institution that has 
held particular promise for many women, thus compromising the potential opportunities implicit in work, such as 
greater economic self-sufficiency and the exploration of new roles and new conceptions of the self not linked to 
stereotyped expectations.”  Id. at 1219-20.  “Indeed, for both women and nonconforming men, sexual harassment 
undermines the primary form of agency we retain as complex subjects in a world of multiple social influences: the 
capacity to put together the disparate elements of self -- biological being, gendered subject, worker, sexual actor -- to 
create a particular, contingent whole in a particular context.”  Id. at 1220. 
152 Id. at 1211.  See also id. at 1225-29 (explaining what proposed account means for same-sex harassment cases, 
and doing so to great degree by comparison to Franke’s theoretical focus on “process of gendering”).   
153 For the response from Bernstein and Franke to this critique, see Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect 
in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1231 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A 
Reply to Professor Abrams, 83 CORNELL. L. REV. 1245 (1998).  Conversely, Abrams asserts that Vicki Schultz’s 
theory “shares many of the assumptions in common with the analysis of sexual harassment I propose here.”  
Abrams, supra note 116, at 1171 n.7.  However, Abrams differentiates herself from Schultz mainly in her concern 
that Schultz’s “‘competence-claiming’ model runs a higher risk of replacing one unitary theory of sexual harassment 
with another.”  Id. at 1215. 
154 Abrams, supra note 116, at 1172. 
155 Id. at 1185.  Abrams states that Bernstein does comment on the meaning of being humiliated at work, but does so 
in passing while arguing that “respect should entail an appreciation of the community that connects the harasser and 
the target.”  Id. Further, Abrams notes that the “indignity that she defines as harassment’s central harm could occur 
anywhere—on the street, in a social institution, in one’s home.”  Id. By doing so, Abrams argues, Bernstein neglects 
important aspects of the injury that can be “specifically attributable to the fact that it occurs in the workplace.”  Id. 
156 Id. Abrams contends Bernstein’s theory is weakened by lack of these “work-specific dimensions,” partly because 
the humiliation of sexual harassment occurs in a location where it has potential to hinder the “earning of one’s 
livelihood and to prevent the achievement of one’s professional fulfillment or self-definition.”  Id.  Further, Abrams 
argues that sexual harassment also takes place “in a setting where women have historically been marginalized or 
relegated to distinct and limited roles and where they continue to face hostility and systematic obstacles to 
professional progress.”  Id. 
157 Id. at 1185.   
158 See id. at 1185-87 (noting that this hierarchy “shapes not only the workplace but also a range of institutions and 
attributes of our social and cultural life,” and that “if we do not appreciate that this dignitary injury is a function of, 
and connected to, other injuries within an unequal, hierarchical relationship, we miss much of what is morally and 
politically significant about the wrong”). 
19
Bernstein glosses over the systemic nature of sexual harassment and reduces the need and ability 
to prevent it.159 
Abrams argues that Franke’s theory fails to focus on the dynamics of the workplace and 
of the particular harm caused by sexual harassment in the workplace.160 Although Franke 
discusses sexual harassment as a workplace wrong, her theory does not focus on what sexual 
harassment means for women in the workplace.161 Abrams criticizes Franke’s choice to reject a 
workplace focus and posits that it is part of Franke’s overall rejection of a subordination-based 
account of sexual harassment.162 
The flaws identified in the subordination-based account of sexual harassment are not 
inevitable, according to Abrams.163 She argues a return to the original conception of sexual 
harassment as a form of discrimination with the subordination of women at its center.164 She 
argues, similar to Schultz, that sexual harassment should be understood as “a means of 
establishing male control and expressing or perpetuating masculine norms in the workplace.”165 
Where women have entered traditionally male fields, thereby challenging male control, they 
have faced particularly flagrant and abusive harassment.166 Other subtler forms of harassment, 
such as treating women in a manner that highlights their sexuality or reminding them to act 
feminine, send the message to women workers that they are not equal in influence or control.167 
As Abrams states, “these forms of harassment suggest that whatever professional goals women 
pursue, they will continue to be viewed and judged by reference to more traditional female roles 
and whatever careers they enter, they will still occupy subordinate roles.”168 
Abrams’s account, then, encompasses certain contra-power harassment situations.  As 
she discussed in a footnote, the sexualization of a female worker “may be more likely to 
disconcert or disenable the target because the conduct seems to be a violat[ion] of the rules of the 
 
159 Id. at 1187.  
160 See id. at 1193.  For a further discussion of the particular harm that Abrams argues is caused by sexual 
harassment in the workplace, see supra note 151 and accompanying text.   
161 See id. at 1193-94.  Abrams argues that while Franke situates sexual harassment within several “society-wide 
dynamics of gender subordination,” she does not adequately address its relation “within the salient dynamics of the 
workplace.”  Id. at 1193.  Abrams states that sexual harassment is unquestionably a form of sex discrimination and 
is additionally linked to alternative forms of discrimination taking place outside the workplace.  Id. at 1194.  Yet 
Abrams claims that sexual harassment is also understood under a statute that prohibits employment discrimination 
on the basis of sex, while exhibiting “crucial connections to other forms of discrimination that occur in that context.”  
Id. Thus, we must examine the particular sex-based dynamics of the workplace to comprehend the practice and 
meaning of sexual harassment itself.  Id.   
162 Id. at 1199-1202.  Abrams is convinced Franke’s reason for “de-emphasizing sex based struggles in the 
workplace” is her concern for the potential conflict a theory of sex-based subordination would create for the theory 
of “gendering” she aims to advance.  Id. at 1199.  Abrams further argues Franke rejects a subordination-based 
account of sexual harassment on three grounds: (1) the theory’s “tendency to biologize the phenomenon;” (2) the 
“transitive” logic of the theory which effectively “obscures the multidirectional force of social construction;” and (3) 
the theory’s conception of sex as always and already sexist.  Id. at 1200-01.  But see Franke, supra note 153, at 
1250-54 (responding to Abrams’s assessment and explaining that in actuality Abrams and herself “agree more than 
we disagree about the normative priority of women’s subordination in a theory of sexual harassment”). 
163 Abrams, supra note 116, at 1172. 
164 Id. at 1171-72.   
165 Id. at 1205.  
166 See id. at 1206 (noting such types of harassment as including “physical or sexual aggression,” and “persistent, 
targeted verbal abuse so severe as to serve unequivocal notice that women are not welcome”). 
167 Id. at 1207-08. 
168 Id. at 1208.  
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game, in that she expected to be treated as a worker.”169 Contra-power harassment is a 
particularly egregious violation of the rules of the game.  After working her way up, the female 
supervisor is then subjected to equal (if not greater) conduct reminding her that she is not the 
boss; she is just a girl.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
Under all of these conceptualizations of the wrong of sexual harassment, contra-power 
harassment is actionable sex discrimination.  It is discrimination “because of sex.”170 Harassing 
a female supervisor inherently smacks of the desire to drive her from her job so as to retain the 
workplace for men and to remind her of her rightful place lower in the hierarchy.  Female 
supervisors may have organizational power but they may be powerless in terms of societal power 
and organizational dynamics.171 Although I am primarily focused on the harassment of female 
supervisors, the question of harassment of male supervisors impacts the existence and viability of 
the contra-power claim.  The sex-role spillover and sociocultural models of sexual harassment do 
not explain the harassment of a male supervisor unless the male supervisor is perceived as not 
masculine enough.  Bernstein would provide a claim to any employee harassed by non-respectful 
behavior.  Abrams, Franke and Schultz, from slightly different angles, would provide a claim 
regardless of the sex of the harasser when the harassment either retains the workplace as a 
bastion of male control or enforces traditional gender roles.  Certainly, any number of fact 
patterns, including the following, may fall into those categories: an effeminate male supervisor is 
harassed for not being sufficiently masculine; a male supervisor is harassed for not playing along 
with the sexual banter because it makes him uncomfortable or he is harassed because he is not 
sexually aggressive enough.  These scenarios should be actionable discrimination under Title VII 
because each seeks to enforce traditional gender roles and reinstate male norms. 
But there is at least one scenario left unanswered.  Should the masculine male supervisor 
harassed in a sexualized manner by a female subordinate have a claim?  Abrams would argue 
“yes” because the unilateral imposition of desire on another person is the entrenching of 
traditional gender dynamic in the workplace.172 However, this scenario does not fit within 
Schultz’s competence-undermining paradigm or Franke’s gendering of workers.  By turning the 
male supervisor into the sexually pursued, there is an inversion of traditional gender dynamics.173 
Thus, under many theories, there is no actionable claim.  The male supervisor, who possesses 
both organizational and sociocultural power, arguably needs less protection.  However, a focus 
on the male supervisor’s status as a supervisor will serve to undermine female supervisors’ 
claims.  Because a female worker may be harassed regardless of her organizational power and 
some male supervisors have claims that go to the heart of Title VII, all supervisors who are 
 
169 Id. at 1216 n.240 (explaining various ways in which sexualization of women in workplace “cast[s] aspersions on 
their work competence”). 
170 For a discussion of when courts should draw inferences that certain types of harassment are discrimination 
“because of sex,” see infra Part IVC. 
171 Martin, supra note 22, at 157. 
172 See Abrams, supra note 116, at 1228.   
173 Strangely, the masculine male supervisor who is harassed by a female subordinate has his best argument in the 
“but for” test that is so soundly rejected by the above theorists. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  If the 
male supervisor can prove that the behavior would not have taken place “but for” his sex, then he has a claim under 
the “but for” test. For a more in-depth discussion of the “but for” test, see infra Part IVC.  I agree with the critiques 
of the “but for” test in that the test screens out too many legitimate claims and does not adequately protect women 
from harassment in the workplace.  Perhaps the “but for” test should be considered as one method to prove 
discrimination “because of sex,” rather than the only method. 
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harassed “because of sex” should fall within the protection of the statute.  This is both logically 
consistent and provides less opportunity for the courts to dismiss meritorious claims based 
simply on the organizational status of the harasser.  The rubber hits the road, of course, when the 
evidence is weighed against the specific elements for proving the claim.  I turn now to the cases 
themselves. 
 
III. Contra-power Cases 
 
Before turning to the elements of a contra-power claim, I will provide a general 
description of the contra-power cases that have reached the federal courts.  After a particularly 
spectacular effort, my research assistants located twenty-four federal court decisions174 involving 
claims of sexual harassment175 in contra-power situations.  Of these decisions, eighteen involved 
female plaintiffs176 and six involved male plaintiffs;177 six of the decisions involved a “win” for 
the plaintiff while the remaining eighteen were losses.178 The intersection of these two factors 
 
174 Although there are twenty-four reported decisions, there are twenty-two cases.  One case with a male plaintiff 
produced two decisions: one at the motion to dismiss stage, see Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 
WL 196616 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000), and one at the summary judgment stage, see Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. 
Supp. 2d 1172 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (granting summary judgment for employer due to employer’s prompt remedial 
action in response to allegations of sexual harassment).  One case with a female plaintiff has a published district 
court opinion, see Wilson v. Univ. of Texas Health Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Tex. 1991) (entering judgment for 
defendants after bench trial), and an appellate decision, see Wilson v. Univ. of Texas Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263 
(5th Cir. 1992) (affirming judgment on sexual harassment claims for defendants).  In addition, there are a few state 
court cases with contra-power facts.  See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chambers, 464 S.E.2d 741 (W.Va. 1995) (hearing female 
office supervisor’s sexual harassment complaint based on conduct by male subordinate). 
175 We also uncovered a number of claims of racial or national origin harassment in a contra-power situation.  See, 
e.g., Starks v. New Par, 181 F.3d 103 (6th Cir. 1999); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 
1985); Callahan v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. 
of Educ., No. 97-CV-7109(ARR), 2001 WL 1328921 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2001); Underwood v. Northport Health 
Servs., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Kincade v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 694 F. Supp. 368 
(M.D. Tenn. 1987); Nieto v. United Auto Workers, 672 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Moffett v. Gene B. Glick 
Co., 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985).  These claims raise the same issues of societal power versus organizational 
power and are worthy of study.  However, I have focused this article on contra-power sexual harassment. 
176 See Pfahl v. Synthes (USA), 13 F. App’x 832 (10th Cir. 2001); Ward v. Bechtel, 102 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1997); 
DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Univ. of Texas Health 
Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1992); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1983); Mingo v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Cleveland v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 96CV1068(RSP/DNH), 1998 
WL 690915 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998); Malladi v. Brown, 987 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Lewis v. Sugar 
Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996); Johnson v. Prof’l Servs. 
Group, No. 4-93-1197, 1996 WL 33324813 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 1996); Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. 
Supp. 672 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Cronin v. United Serv. 
Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Wilson v. Univ. of Texas Health Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. 
Tex. 1991); Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr. Auth., Civ. A. No. 88-4232, 1990 WL 267417 (D.N.J. 1990); 
Kirkland v Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), aff’d, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991); Perkins v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Otterstedt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 96 M.S.P.R. 688 (M.S.P.B. 2004). 
177 See Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 
148 (D.P.R. 2003); Needham v. BI, Inc., No. 00 C 1550, 2001 WL 558144 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001); Jones v. U.S. 
Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 196616 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000); Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. Supp. 
2d 1172 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Odom v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Mo. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 
1347 (8th Cir. 2000). 
178 I counted a decision as a “win” if the plaintiff secured final judgment in her or his favor or survived a motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment.  See Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 569 (2001) (defining win rates). 
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produces thirteen cases in which female plaintiffs lost and five in which they won; five losses for 
male plaintiffs and one win.179 
A few courts have explicitly discussed whether a contra-power claim is viable.  The court 
in Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co. referred to the organizational status of the parties as a “red 
herring.”180 The court stated that the “capacity of any persons to create a hostile or offensive 
work environment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of authority which 
the employer confers on that individual.”181 Moffett added that the hierarchical relationship of 
the parties has relevance only in determining the standard of employer liability.182 The status of 
the alleged harassers as subordinates did not automatically preclude their creation of a hostile 
work environment.183 The opinion in Cronin v. United Service Stations, Inc. echoed similar 
sentiments.184 The defendants in Cronin tried to avoid liability by emphasizing that Cronin was 
harassed by a subordinate.185 The court recognized the relevance of the contra-power facts 
(although without using the term “contra-power harassment”) but said that the existence of 
contra-power facts alone does not preclude a claim of sexual harassment.186 The court noted that 
a hostile environment can be created by a subordinate just the same as by a supervisor.187 
Similarly, in Kirkland v. Brinias, the court recognized that “unlike the situation in the typical 
harassment case, the unwelcome behavior came from a subordinate, not a supervisor.”188 
Further, the court opined that the behavior in question would create a hostile working 
environment for a reasonable person.189 
Some courts relied upon the organizational power relationship between the harasser and 
the victim to hold that there was no actionable claim.  In Odom v. St. Louis Community College,
where the claimant was male, the court found that the “respective positions” of the parties was 
the most important factor.190 “[A] subordinate employee could not have created an environment 
so pervasively hostile or abusive that it would have affected a term or condition of a reasonable 
supervisor’s employment.”191 Although the court expressed doubt about the claim, the doubt 
 
179 This produces an overall win rate of 25% for these cases, both trial and appellate.  This is a significantly lower 
win rate than found in a previous study of sexual harassment cases.  See id. at 576 (finding 51% win rate in district 
courts and 39% in appellate courts).  Male plaintiffs won 17% of the time (one case) and the female plaintiffs 27% 
of the time (five cases).  Six cases were heard by appellate courts (one male plaintiff and five female plaintiffs), and 
in each case the court found for the defendant. 
180 Moffett, 621 F. Supp. at 272.  See also Mingo, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (“Although Mingo was a supervisor, 
‘plaintiff’s status as supervisor of those harassing [her] . . . is a non-issue’ . . . .”); Lewis, 1996 WL 685730, at *2 
(discussing that several courts have rejected argument that, as matter of law, supervisor cannot bring hostile 
environment claim if environment is created by subordinates). 
181 Moffet, 621 F. Supp. at 272. 
182 Id. 
183 Id.  
184 Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (finding that male subordinate created 
hostile work environment for female supervisor and co-workers). 
185 Id. at 931. 
186 Id. at 931-32 (distinguishing hostile environment harassment from quid pro quo harassment). 
187 Id. at 932.   
188 Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 698 (M.D. Tenn. 1989). 
189 Id.  The court went on to find that the plaintiffs had not suffered any harmful psychological effects.  Id. This 
decision was issued several years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., wherein the 
Court held that actual psychological harm is not required to prove a hostile environment claim.  See Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993).  See also infra notes 302-04 and accompanying text (examining make-up 
of hypothetical “reasonable person”). 
190 Odom v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
191 Id. (noting that plaintiff was not just supervising, but in sole charge at time of incident).  
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was couched in an analysis of the severe or pervasive requirement.192 Many courts simply do not 
discuss the viability of the contra-power claim. 
On a factual level, all but one of the cases in which the plaintiff won involved sexually 
explicit comments directed at the plaintiff.  For example, in Cleveland v. International Paper 
Co., the plaintiff’s subordinates teased her about sexual matters, inquired into her sex life and 
occasionally made lewd references to her breasts.193 In Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., the 
plaintiff was a female dock supervisor who was subjected to continual vulgar conduct by her 
male subordinates.194 Several subordinates requested sexual relations with Mingo and one 
caressed her arm.195 In Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., a female store manager was 
consistently harassed by a male subordinate.196 The subordinate talked about her breasts, asked 
to see them, propositioned her for sex, grabbed her breasts and brushed her genital region.197 
Similarly, in Cronin, the plaintiff was harassed by an African-American subordinate who called 
her a “dumb, old stupid woman,” asked her if she “liked black dick,” touched her on her neck 
and shoulder, asked her to have a “good time” with him, and once grabbed her, stating that he 
wanted a “good feel.”198 The final winning case for a female plaintiff involved gender 
harassment in which the subordinate threw a paperweight at the plaintiff while calling her a bitch 
and a whore and remained abusive to the plaintiff throughout her employment.199 
In the sole case in which a male plaintiff was successful, a male supervisor alleged that 
he was struck in the groin by a female subordinate.200 He further alleged that the employee had 
struck other men at the workplace in the groin and the employer had taken no action against 
her.201 Against an argument by the employer that a single incident could not constitute a hostile 
environment, the court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss.202 
In the unsuccessful claims, the factual scenarios also involved sexually explicit comments 
or behavior, but the courts found the allegations did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive.  
For example, in Johnson v. Professional Services Group, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that a hostile 
work environment was created when male subordinates at a recycling center removed 
pornographic magazines from the trash and read them at work.203 The court found this behavior 
“not severe enough to impose liability.”204 In Kirkland v. Brinias, two female waitresses alleged 
that a male busboy had subjected them to sexual advances, propositions, threats and physical 
 
192 For a further discussion of the severe or pervasive requirement, see infra Part IVD. 
193 Cleveland v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 96CV1068(RSP/DNH), 1998 WL 690915, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998). 
194 Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (listing ten specific incidents of 
sexually charged comments by subordinates against plaintiff). 
195 Id. 
196 Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996). 
197 Id. (recounting numerous events that occurred over four months, culminating with plaintiff’s resignation). 
198 Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 925 (M.D. Ala. 1992). 
199 Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672, 678 (S.D. Tex. 1995). 
200 Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 196616 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000). 
201 See id. (allowing plaintiff to argue that female employee targeted only men with this activity). 
202 See id. (noting that this single incident was in fact sufficiently severe to create actionable hostile work 
environment).  Ultimately, plaintiff Jones was not successful.  See Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1172 
(2000) (entitling summary judgment for defendants on Jones’ hostile work environment claim). 
203 Johnson v. Prof’l Servs. Group, Inc., No. 4-93-1197, 1996 WL 33324813, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 1996). 
204 Id. at *6.  The infamous Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co. decision from the Sixth Circuit also addressed pornography 
in the workplace.  See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).  The plaintiff’s complaint hinged 
primarily on the behavior of one co-worker.  However, plaintiff also made allegations concerning the display of 
pornography in the workplace.  Because the court did not clearly identify the organizational status of the men who 
posted the pornography, I did not include this case.   
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contact.205 The court held that neither plaintiff suffered any harmful psychological effects.206 In 
Ott v. Perk Development Corp., the only explicit sexual incident occurred when the subordinate 
placed a pornographic magazine in his female supervisor’s notebook.207 The court stated that 
this incident, when combined with other instances of non-sexually based disparate treatment, was 
enough to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie case.208 Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff 
did not show that the defendant intentionally engaged in a course of sexually harassing conduct 
and accordingly granted summary judgment for the employer.209 Likewise, in DeAngelis v. El 
Paso Municipal Police Officers Ass’n, the court found that six derogatory gender-based articles 
in the local police station paper over the course of two years were not enough to create a hostile 
environment.210 In other claims alleging unwelcome sexual remarks or threats and physical 
assault by a subordinate, the court found that the employer could not be held liable because the 
plaintiff had requested that the employer not take any action,211 the employer had responded 
promptly212 or that the behavior of subordinates could not be attributed to the employer.213 Other 
contra-power facts presented include a subordinate attempting to kiss his supervisor,214 sexual 
touching, comments, propositions215 and general insubordination.216 
205 Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 693 (M.D. Tenn. 1989).  Note that this decision was issued prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Harris. See supra note 189. 
206 Id. at 698 (finding no psychological damage despite presence of hostile and intimidating work environment). 
207 Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266, 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
208 Id. at 273 (noting that court must consider totality of circumstances to determine whether plaintiff has met 
minimum burden to show unwelcome gender-based harassment). 
209 Id. at 275 (dismissing plaintiff’s work shift statistics as insufficient to create genuine issue of fact regarding 
plaintiff’s performance evaluations). 
210 DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1995).  See also Reynolds v. 
Atlantic City Convention Ctr. Auth., Civ. A. No. 88-4232, 1990 WL 267417 (D.N.J. 1990).  In Reynolds, the court 
rejected the contra-power fact evidence.  Id. at *26.  The plaintiff alleged, among another things, that her male co-
workers resisted her supervision to the point of refusal and quitting rather than working for her.  Id. at *5.  The court 
categorized this evidence as “other harassment” and rejected its usefulness in determining a hostile environment.  Id. 
at *19.  The refusal to work for the plaintiff “is not ‘verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature’ and so does not 
figure into the calculus of a sexually offensive working environment.”  Id. Because the court found that only three 
sexually explicit or obscene comments had been made in her presence, the harassment was not sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to amount to a hostile working environment.  Id. at *18.  See also Pfahl v. Synthes (USA), 13 F. App’x 
832, 835 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that, over course of ten years, derogatory language, instance of hugging, and 
items twice being left on plaintiff’s desk did not create hostile work environment). 
211 See, e.g., Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding employer not liable despite actual 
knowledge because plaintiff asked her supervisor to keep conversation confidential). 
212 See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1997) (establishing that employer investigated 
plaintiff’s allegations and disciplined and reassigned abuser).  
213 See Malladi v. Brown, 987 F. Supp. 893, 909 (M.D. Ala. 1997).  In a case which can only be referred to as a 
“kitchen sink” approach to litigation, the plaintiff alleged that her subordinates made inaccurate comments 
concerning her workload and interpersonal skills to the Equal Employment Opportunity counselor investigating her 
“ninth” EEO charge.  Id. at 900.  The plaintiff alleged that these comments had the effect of changing her work 
environment and leading to her reassignment.  Id. at 909.  The court held that the subordinates could not impact the 
terms or conditions of plaintiff’s employment.  Id. 
214 See Wilson v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 958, 960 (E.D. Texas 1991), aff’d, 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 
1992) (citing subordinate employee’s attempt to kiss plaintiff on neck as element of sexual harassment claim). 
215 See Perkins v, Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1497 (W.D. Mo. 1989).  The court found the plaintiff not 
credible in general.  Id. at 1498.  In regard to the contra-power allegations, the court found that the plaintiff had the 
supervisory authority to stop the conduct and punish the offender.  Id. at 1500-01. 
216 See Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 777 (5th Cir. 1983).  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that her 
authority had been undermined by her subordinates’ behavior which included refusing to listen to her and making 
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The complaints by men were similarly treated.  In Jones v. United States Gypsum, the 
plaintiff alleged he was physically assaulted by a female subordinate who grabbed him in the 
groin area.217 The plaintiff in Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co. alleged repeated sexual touching by 
employees of each other’s buttocks, sexually explicit comments, exposure, and an attempt at oral 
sex by a subordinate.218 In Davis v. Coastal International Security, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that 
his male co-workers engaged in a campaign of harassment against him, including slashing his 
tires and making vulgar comments and obscene gestures.219 In Needham v. BI, Inc., the plaintiff 
alleged that he was harassed by a female subordinate who rubbed against him, called him at 
home to discuss her personal life and generally asked the plaintiff to be responsible for the 
subordinate’s personal life.220 
In Odom v. St. Louis Community College, the plaintiff alleged he was subject to a hostile 
work environment created by a female subordinate.221 Specifically, he alleged that the 
subordinate made sexually explicit comments such as suggesting that the plaintiff could put 
Vaseline on his crotch, noting the size of plaintiff’s thumbs and remarking that she was glad that 
he was not her gynecologist, and sticking a doughnut between her legs, indicating that the 
doughnut had been there earlier.222 The most explicit incident occurred when the subordinate 
followed the plaintiff to his office, rubbed her genital area while commenting that she was “hot 
and horny” and that someone would need to get a mop to “clean up the puddle she had just left 
on the floor.”223 The court found that the behavior was not aimed at altering the conditions of 
the plaintiff’s employment.224 
In sum, the facts alleged in contra-power cases are not dissimilar from the “typical” co-
worker or supervisor harassment case.  Courts do seem to give less credence to claims by male 
supervisors that their female subordinates have harassed them.  Further, many courts look 
askance on female supervisors complaining about their subordinates.  But if the facts are not 
overtly dissimilar from the conventional harassment claim, does the contra-power claim itself 
need to change?   
 
racial remarks.  Id. at 779.  “We are convinced that [the plaintiff] stood above the remarks and her position or 
authority suffered nothing because of them.”  Id. at 778. 
217 Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (N.D. Iowa 2000).  The court found that the employer had 
acted appropriately in response to the complaints of harassment.  Id. at 1179. 
218 Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 (D.P.R. 2003).  The court found that the employer acted 
appropriately in response to the sexual encounter by investigating and dismissing the harasser.  Id. at 159.  Further, 
the plaintiff was not exposed to any disadvantageous conditions to which female co-worker would not be exposed.  
Id. at 160. 
219 Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  The court found no evidence that the 
harassment was because of the sex of the plaintiff as opposed to a workplace grudge.  Id. at 1125-26. 
220 Needham v. BI, Inc., No. 00 C 1550, 2001 WL 558144, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001).  In this case, the 
plaintiff was fired because the employer believed he had sexually harassed a subordinate.  Id. at *1.  The plaintiff 
alleged that the subordinate had harassed him.  Id. at *3.  Because the female subordinate was not dismissed, 
plaintiff argued that his dismissal was discrimination on the basis of sex.  Id. at *6.  The court granted summary 
judgment to the employer on the grounds that plaintiff had no evidence that his firing was based on sex.  Id. at *8. 
221 Odom v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (E.D. Mo. 1999).  
222 Id. at 900-01 (recounting instances of subordinate’s inappropriate and sexually-charged exchanges with plaintiff). 
223 Id. at 901.  Another co-worker also witnessed the subordinate’s actions and told the subordinate that these actions 
were “offensive.”  Id. 
224 Id. at 903 (noting that actions of individual subordinate did not meet severity or pervasive requirements to 
sufficiently affect plaintiff’s terms or conditions of employment). 
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IV. Creating the Claim 
 
As is evident from the above descriptions of contra-power cases, the behavior 
complained of in a contra-power case is often no different than that complained of in a 
“standard” hostile environment case.  The question then is whether the regular elements of a 
hostile environment claim may be applied to a contra-power case or whether the requirements 
must be adjusted to fit the atypical fact pattern.  I address the first four elements of a hostile 
environment case in this Part and turn to the question of employer liability in Part V. 
A hostile environment claim arises when an employee must endure verbal or physical 
abuse based on a protected characteristic as part of the “terms [or] conditions” of employment 
but does not suffer a tangible job detriment.225 These claims were first recognized in the early 
1980s.226 From these cases, a five-part test emerged for a hostile environment claim based on 
sex.  The plaintiff must show: (1) that the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) that the 
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, including sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;227 (3) that the harassment 
complained of was because of sex; (4) that the harassment complained of was severe or 
pervasive enough to affect a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) employer 
liability for the behavior and failure to take prompt remedial action.228 
Although more than twenty years old, these five elements essentially remain today.229 
Each element has been further interpreted by the courts.  Below I consider each element, how it 
is applied in a “standard” hostile environment case, how courts are applying it in contra-power 
cases, and what modifications, if any, should be made for the contra-power claim. 
 
A.  A Member of the Protected Class
225 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).  This type of hostile environment claim was originally 
recognized in Rogers as a national origin claim under Title VII.  See id. at 237. 
226 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (agreeing that offensive or hostile work 
environment can violate Title VII irrespective of whether plaintiff suffers tangible job detriment); Bundy v. Jackson, 
641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding sex discrimination where employer created or condoned 
substantially discriminatory work environment regardless of whether complaining employees lost any tangible job 
benefits as result of discrimination). 
227 See Henson, 682 F.2d at 901.  Although the Henson court formulated the test as requiring sexualized conduct, 
some courts have acknowledged claims of a hostile environment based on non-sexualized behavior.  See, e.g., 
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding overt sexual harassment not necessary to 
establish sexually hostile environment); Hall v. Gus Contsr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Intimidation 
and hostility toward women because they are women can obviously result from conduct other than explicit sexual 
advances.”); Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266, 273 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“However, the conduct underlying a 
sexual harassment claim need not be sexual in nature as long as the conduct is directed at the employee because of 
his or her sex.”). 
228 See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05.   
229 Some courts no longer explicitly require the plaintiff to prove that the conduct was “unwelcome” when making a 
hostile environment claim based on sex.  See, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(requiring only that (1) sufficiently severe and pervasive discriminatory intimidation permeated and altered 
conditions of work environment, and (2) specific basis exists to impute employer liability); Buffa v. N.J. State Dep’t 
of Judiciary, 56 F. App’x 571, 575 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring only that plaintiff prove (1) discrimination because of 
her [disability], and (2) this conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to create hostile environment for 
reasonable person).     
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The court in Henson v. City of Dundee described this element as requiring “a simple 
stipulation that the employee is a man or a woman.”230 Not all courts require this element of the 
claim.231 Arguably, proving the plaintiff is a member of the protected class is an absolute, albeit 
formal, requirement.  Without establishing this element, the protections of Title VII are not 
triggered.  For example, a male employee who alleges that he is harassed because he is gay has 
not shown he is within the protected class and thus has no cognizable claim. 
However, these theoretical issues are considered in the context of the “because of sex” 
requirement, which is language taken directly from Title VII.232 Under this requirement, as 
discussed below, the plaintiff must prove that she or he was harassed due to her or his sex.  Thus, 
as Professor Beiner has aptly stated, “this element adds nothing to the claim, given that the 
plaintiff must already prove that she was harassed based on her sex.”233 As could then be 
expected, contra-power cases do not present any distinct issues for this element. 
 
B.  Subject to Unwelcome Harassment
The Henson court described the element of unwelcomeness as requiring the plaintiff to 
prove that she did not solicit or “incite” the behavior and that she found it undesirable or 
offensive.234 The Supreme Court, in its first ruling recognizing a hostile environment claim, held 
that “the gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 
‘unwelcome.’”235 The Court then allowed the possibility that a plaintiff’s sexually provocative 
speech or dress is relevant to determine whether certain sexual advances were unwelcome.236 
The unwelcome requirement has been much criticized for placing the plaintiff on trial 
and for requiring the plaintiff to assume the burden of proving what should be a defense.237 I
have previously called for its abolishment or, barring that, for a restriction on the type of 
evidence that may be considered to prove, or more importantly, to disprove the 
 
230 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. 
231 The Second, Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuits do not appear to require the plaintiff to prove that she is a 
member of the protected class as a formal element of the claim.  See, e.g., Clegg v. Falcon Plastics, Inc., No. 05-
1826, 2006 WL 887937, at *4 (3d Cir. 2006); Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005); Bhella v. 
England, 91 F. App’x 835, 846 (4th Cir. 2004); Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir. 2001).  Although 
some decisions in the Tenth Circuit do not list this element as a requirement, see Smith v. EEOC, No. 05-2049, 2006 
WL 1230680, slip op. at *3 (10th Cir. 2006), others do.  See Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1263 
(10th Cir. 2005).    
232 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (1964) (defining terms “because of sex” and “on the basis 
of sex”). 
233 Beiner, supra note 79, at 9.  
234 See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (citing Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., Inc., No. 81-268 C(5), 1982 WL 166 (E.D. Mo. 
1982); Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100 (D.D.C. 1980); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980)). 
235 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). 
236 See id. at 69.  The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was erroneous in its 
decision that testimony admitted into evidence by the District Court and given about the respondent’s “dress and 
personal fantasies” had no place in the litigation.  Id.  The Court explained further that the “evidence is obviously 
relevant” as the “EEOC guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual 
harassment in light of ‘the record as a whole’ and ‘the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual 
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.’”  Id.   
237 See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. 
L. REV. 499 (1994) (questioning validity of current model of proof as to unwelcome requirement and proposing 
alternative method which would require proof of welcomeness rather than unwelcomeness in sexual harassment 
cases). 
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“unwelcomeness” of the behavior.238 Some circuits have responded to the critiques by not 
requiring a showing of “unwelcomeness,”239 though many still maintain the requirement.240 
Although fewer cases are thrown out for failure to meet this requirement than any other 
element,241 the unwelcome requirement continues to garner interest in the scholarly 
community.242 In recent years, some feminist scholars have argued strongly and convincingly 
that the unwelcome requirement should be retained.243 These arguments are often cast in terms 
of women’s agency.  Women’s agency refers to the ability of women to define the role-relations 
they wish to engage in at work through their performance.  Professor Franke has argued that 
removing the requirement casts doubt on women’s ability to consent to or reject sexual 
advances.244 The unwelcome requirement “clearly presupposes a degree of female agency in 
these contexts.”245 Again, women may wish to engage in certain conduct or discussions with 
some co-workers but not others.   
Professor Abrams also seeks to recognize and support female agency while protecting 
women from sexual harassment.  She proposes moderating the unwelcome requirement by 
contextualizing the type of behavior alleged to have created the hostile environment.246 She 
argues that for sexual propositions, touchings and nonsexual forms of harassment, a showing of 
unwelcomeness should not be required.247 Rather, the plaintiff should show that “the conduct 
was unilateral or disregarding her desires.”248 However, Abrams argues that in regard to 
 
238 Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The “Unwelcome” Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1587-92 (1992) (arguing that only evidence of specific interactions between employee 
victim and harasser should be admissible at trial). 
239 See, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2004); Buffa v. N.J. State Dep’t of Judiciary, 56 F. 
App’x 571, 576 (3d Cir. 2003).  
240 See, e.g., Harris-Childs v. Medco Health Solutions Inc., 169 F. App’x 913, 917 (5th Cir. 2006); Kelly v. Senior 
Ctrs., Inc., 169 F. App’x 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2006); Parker v. Atlanta Newspapers Name Holding Corp., No. 05-
15722, 2006 WL 1594427, at *2 (11th Cir. June 12, 2006); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92 (1st Cir. 
2005); Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005); Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health and Senior 
Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2005); Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Bhella v. England, 91 F. App’x 835, 845 (4th Cir. 2004); Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
241 See Beiner, supra note 79, at 90.   
242 See, e.g., Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome Influence of Rape 
Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 125 (1995); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile 
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733 (2002); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 826-34 (1991); 
Juliano, supra note 238; Elsie Mata, Note, Title VII Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Claims: Changing the 
Legal Framework Courts Use to Determine Whether Challenged Conduct is Unwelcome, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
791 (2001); Miranda Oshige, Note, What’s Sex Got to Do with It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1995); Radford, supra 
note 237; Joan S. Weiner, Note, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a 
Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (1997); Casey J. Wood, “Inviting Sexual Harassment”: The 
Absurdity of the Welcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 423 (2000). 
243 See Franke, supra note 111, at 746-47 (arguing in favor of retaining unwelcome requirement and against 
alternative of presuming that all sexual conduct in workplace is unwelcome).  
244 Id. at 746. 
245 Id. at 746-47. 
246 Abrams, supra note 116, at 1221.   
247 See id. (explaining that with nonsexual forms of harassment such as “derogation of opportunity, failure to train, 
or sabotage of equipment unwelcomeness should be assumed,” and that cases involving “sexual propositions or 
touchings entail a substantial risk of a trial of the victim, in which a range of stereotypes hostile to women’s 
sexuality may be mobilized”).   
248 See id. at 1222.  Abrams argues this is a better approach, as unwelcomeness is the wrong standard in such a 
context.  Id. She contends that the standard used “should not focus triers' attention on the nature of the target's 
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sexualized talk or representations, the courts should not presume that such behavior is 
unacceptable.249 Abrams argues that the unwelcome requirement in such cases recognizes 
women’s agency.250 She cautions that courts should be flexible in the type of evidence that may 
show unwelcomeness, such as leaving the room or changing the subject.251 Similarly, Professor 
Schultz reaches the same end as Abrams, although by different means.  Recall that her focus is 
on competence-undermining activity, much of it non-sexual.  She argues that once courts 
reconceptualize sexual harassment as an assault on competence, “the unwelcomeness inquiry 
makes no sense.  Although some people may welcome expressions of sexual interest, few 
employees invite conduct that attacks their work performance in the name of gender 
conformity.”252 
Only three of the contra-power cases discuss the unwelcome requirement in more than 
passing.253 None of the courts in these cases hinge their analysis on the nature of the contra-
power facts.  In Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., the court simply noted that it credited the 
plaintiff’s testimony that she had indicated to the harasser that his advances were not 
welcome.254 Further, the court found that the harasser knew his advances were unwelcome.255 
The plaintiff refused to go out with the harasser and repeatedly asked him not to touch her.256 
When the harasser tried to strike her, she fired him.257 The court also rejected a particularly 
irrelevant and offensive argument of the defendant.  The employer argued that the plaintiff was 
abused at home and therefore could not have viewed the behavior at work as unwelcome.258 The 
court soundly rejected this line of attack.259 In Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd., defendants 
argued that the plaintiff had invited the harasser’s behavior because she and the harasser fought 
with each other on a regular basis.260 The court found that the plaintiff had presented sufficient 
evidence that the plaintiff neither made derogatory statements about the harasser nor provoked or 
invited hostile behavior.261 Thus, the court denied summary judgment.262 In Perkins v. General 
Motors Corp., one of the many reasons that the plaintiff was unsuccessful in her claim was the 
 
response but on the nature of the perpetrator's act.”  Id.  Thus, the question to ask is “not whether sexual advances in 
the workplace are presumptively acceptable but whether the coercive imposition of sex is forbidden.”  Id. 
249 See id.  “In the case of sexualized talk or representations, a showing of unwelcomeness may be more appropriate 
because the plaintiff’s response is less likely to be assimilated to stigmatizing stereotypes.”  Id. 
250 See id.  
251 See id. (explaining courts should not require all plaintiffs to prove unwelcomeness by “contemporaneous verbal 
objection to the perpetrator,” yet should accept evidence of unwelcomeness through more standard responses that 
“reflect the constraints under which many sexual harassment victims operate”). 
252 Schultz, supra note 16, at 1802. 
253 See Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 
809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989). 
254 See Cronin, 809 F. Supp. at 929 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (noting that court was “convinced that Cronin indicated to 
Webster that his advances were not welcome” and that “evidence indicates that Cronin ‘did not solicit or incite’ 




258 Id. at 932.   
259 See id. (stating argument lacked merit and fact that Cronin “may have been abused at home in no way means that 
Cronin deserved abuse at work, that she ‘welcomed’ Webster’s abuse, or that she could not possibly be affected by 
Webster’s actions because she was used to such abuse”).   
260 Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672, 683 (S.D. Tex. 1995). 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 684. 
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unwelcome requirement.263 The court found the plaintiff was an “active, encouraging participant 
in sexually explicit conversations and actions” by co-workers and subordinates.264 Further, the 
court found that in the “few” circumstances where the conduct went too far, the plaintiff had the 
“ability to take care of the situation and to stop that conduct.”265 
In sum, the contra-power case law does not suggest a need for a change in the unwelcome 
requirement specific to contra-power cases.  However, I argue for a modification to the 
requirement.  Courts should adopt Schultz and Abrams’s argument that sexual propositions and 
touchings, as well as non-sexual harassing behavior, are inherently not welcome.  I would go the 
next step and argue that the courts should presume that sexualized behavior is unwelcome when 
directed at a supervisor from a subordinate.  I realize that this modification implicates women’s 
agency.  The focus on women’s agency is one which I fully support.  Women should not be held 
to Victorian ideals nor be required to remove any sexually based conversations from their 
workplace in order to remain as “acceptable” plaintiffs.  In fact, the importance of recognizing 
and supporting women’s agency forms the basis for my recommendations on employer liability.  
However, social science research supports my proposed modification for the unwelcome 
requirement.  Women have indicated that contra-power harassment is more likely to be 
considered unwelcome than co-worker harassment.266 Further, because female supervisors are 
already acting outside of prescribed gender roles, they often face a heightened effort by male 
subordinates attempting to reinforce traditional norms.  The arguments against the unwelcome 
requirement are especially relevant to claims of contra-power harassment.  Therefore, courts 
should presume that harassing behavior directed at a supervisor from a subordinate is 
unwelcome. 
 
C.  Because of Sex
Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of . . . sex.”  As described above in Part IIB, 
proving that sexual harassment is discrimination “because of sex” was one of the initial hurdles 
for the claim.267 Once the concept of the claim was accepted, the premise was not questioned for 
many years.  The issue of same-sex harassment raised the fundamental questions anew.  Scholars 
proposed a number of fascinating theoretical constructs to provide an actionable claim for same-
sex harassment.268 The Supreme Court provided guidance and sowed the seeds of confusion in 
its Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. decision.269 
In a decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that Title VII prohibits same-sex 
harassment.270 Mr. Oncale worked on an offshore oil platform with seven other men.  A co-
worker and two supervisors threatened to rape him, sexually assaulted him and subjected him to 
 
263 See Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1500 (W.D. Mo. 1989).  In regard to the plaintiff’s 
sexually hostile work environment claim, the court noted that Perkins failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the 
unwelcome incidents that did occur “reasonably affected a term, condition or privilege of her employment.”  Id. at 
1501.  Further, the court claimed Perkins failed to prove that her employer knew or should have known of the 
harassment that she complained of and failed to take proper remedial action.  Id.  
264 Id. at 1500. 
265 Id. at 1500-01. 
266 Wayne, supra note 16, at 319. 
267 See supra Part IIB. 
268 Or at least most forms of it.  See Franke, supra note 111, at 766-67 (arguing that requests for sexual favors by gay 
supervisors or male employees should not be actionable as sexual harassment but rather as disparate treatment sex 
discrimination claims). 
269 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
270 Id. at 82. 
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other humiliating actions.271 The district court and the Fifth Circuit dismissed the claim, holding 
that same-sex harassment was not actionable under Title VII.272 
The Supreme Court reversed, without resort to grand theory.273 Rather, Justice Scalia 
relied on the plain language of the statute and held that Title VII prohibits discrimination because 
of sex.274 Thus, a victim must simply show that the conduct was directed at the plaintiff because 
of her sex.275 In other words, she has suffered treatment that members of the other sex do not.276 
Same-sex harassment is therefore prohibited regardless of whether the harasser or the victim is 
homosexual.277 The Court specifically discussed a showing of “direct comparative evidence 
about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”278 In 
addition, the Court instructed lower courts to determine whether a hostile environment exists 
“from the perspective of the reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the 
circumstances.’”279 The Court then offered an example of such circumstances: whether the 
football coach smacks the butt of his secretary in the office or one of his players on the field.280 
The Court then remanded for further proceedings.281 
This simple statutory interpretation has created a great deal of confusion.  First, the 
Court’s focus on the statutory language reinvigorates the “but for” test of sexual harassment.  
Some courts have strictly construed the “but for” test.282 Unless a plaintiff can prove she was 
targeted for harassment because she is a woman, she cannot prove the “because of sex” 
requirement.283 For example, if a workplace is rife with sexually derogatory language and 
sexually explicit comments and all employees are subject to this environment, the plaintiff will 
not be able to show that she experiences disadvantageous conditions that male employees do not 
experience.284 
Second, in order to meet the “but for” test under the Oncale opinion, a plaintiff will need 
some sort of comparator group.  That is, the plaintiff must show that she or he was treated 
differently than workers of the opposite sex.  So plaintiffs like Mr. Oncale, who worked only 
with men, will be without a viable means to meet the test.   
 
271 Id. at 77. 
272 Id.
273 Id. at 75. 
274 Id. at 79-80. 
275 Id. at 81. 
276 Id. at 80. 
277 Id.
278 Id. at 80-81. 
279 Id. at 81. 
280 Id.
281 Id. at 82. 
282 See, e.g., Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2001); Holman v. Ind., 211 F.3d 399, 404 (7th 
Cir. 2000).  See also Leeser, supra note 113, at 1752 (arguing that the “but-for” test has left plaintiffs in 
environments with a high level of harassment without a federal remedy). 
283 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
284 See Ocheltree v. Scollo Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003).  
Although the full court eventually vacated the decision, the panel held that the vast majority of the conduct 
complained of occurred in the course of the male workers’ “daily bantering toward one another” and was simply 
overheard by the plaintiff.  Id. at 357.  Moreover, the men’s behavior did “not begin or change as of the date [the 
plaintiff] began working” for the employer.  Id. Thus, she was not subject to any treatment that male workers were 
spared.  Id. at 356.  Of the three “arguably gender-related” incidents directed to the plaintiff, the court found that 
they did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive.  Id. at 359. 
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For contra-power claims, Oncale provides the theoretical underpinnings of an actionable 
claim.   As long as the victim-supervisor proves that she was the target of the conduct because of 
her sex, she has an actionable claim.  In fact, Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the statutory language 
makes various factual scenarios actionable under Title VII, including a same-sex, contra-power 
claim.  Anticipating the criticism that Title VII will cease to be meaningful if any and all fact 
patterns fall within it, I have two responses.  First, this is the import of Justice Scalia’s decision.  
As long as the evidentiary standard is met for “because of sex,” no claim is ruled out.  Second, in 
practice, the claim will not be stretched beyond all meaning because the evidentiary issues will 
limit the successful claims. 
Meeting the evidentiary burden in practice is difficult.  In Davis v. Coastal International 
Security, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that he was harassed by two subordinates who slashed his tires 
and made obscene verbal comments and gestures.285 Noting that the plaintiff had disciplined the 
alleged harassers, the court found that “there is simply no evidence that they were harassing Mr. 
Davis because of their gender or because of his gender.”286 Thus, even though the plaintiff’s 
claim was based at least in part on obscene comments and gestures, the court rejected any 
finding of “because of sex.”287 Similarly, in Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., the plaintiff alleged a 
hostile environment created by “salesmen touching each other’s buttocks at work [and] making 
sexually explicit statements,” culminating in a sexual encounter with a male subordinate in a 
hotel.288 With respect to the generalized behavior, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim 
foundered on the “because of sex” requirement.289 “The [c]ourt’s main concern is that the 
behavior complained of does not display any discrimination based on sex.  It does not appear that 
Plaintiff was exposed to any disadvantageous condition of employment [to] which a female co-
worker would not be exposed.”290 Although the court labeled the environment “inappropriate 
and explicit,” it was not discriminatory on the basis of sex.291 These decisions are both post-
Oncale and are examples in practice of the criticisms against the opinion.292 
Although these decisions seem to suggest that courts invoke the “because of sex” 
requirement to dismiss a claim by the plaintiff, there is one contra-power case which holds, in 
favor of the plaintiff, that the actions were “because of sex.”293 This final contra-power case 
discussing “because of sex” involves a woman harassed by a male subordinate.294 The court 
found that the harasser’s comments and behavior were “derogatory and insulting to women 
generally, and overtly demeaning to [the plaintiff] personally.”295 Further, his behavior “reflects 
an attitude that women are to be viewed as only objects of ridicule, abuse, or sexual pleasure.”296 
The court adopted the “but for” test: “but for the fact that Cronin was a woman, she would not 
 
285 Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
286 Id. at 1122. 
287 Id. at 1123-25. 
288 Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 148, 159 (D.P.R. 2003). 
289 Id. at 160. 
290 Id.
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292 There is one pre-Oncale opinion involving a female plaintiff wherein the court parsed the evidence and found 
that hostility to a change in office protocol was the basis of some of the challenged behavior.  See Johnson v. Prof’l 
Servs. Group, Inc., No. 4-93-1197, 1996 WL 33324813, at *7 (D. Minn. April 17, 1996). 
293 Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, 809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992). 
294 Id. at 925. 
295 Id. at 929. 
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have been subject to such harassment.”297 Therefore, the court found the “because of sex” 
requirement met.   
What are the evidentiary issues for a contra-power case?  Social science research 
hypothesizes that those lower in organizational status will harass to re-establish societal power.  
Men will harass when the supervisor is not “one of the guys” – either because this is literally 
true, in the case of a female supervisor, or because the supervisor is gay or perceived as gay.298 
A particular evidentiary problem for contra-power harassment is the very nature of the claim - 
the boss is being harassed.  It is not unheard of to give the boss a difficult time.  This, of course, 
begs the question.  If the subordinates dislike the female supervisor because she is a female 
supervisor, then an actionable claim is present.  It is the intersection of sex and power that causes 
the subordinates to react with harassing behavior.  By singling out the female supervisors, the 
subordinates have chosen to harass “because of sex.”  The fact that female co-workers are not 
harassed has no evidentiary bearing on whether the female supervisor has been singled out 
because of her sex.  If this is the intersection between sex and power, the presence of “sex” in the 
calculation is enough to trigger liability under the statute.299 Even if male supervisors are 
harassed as well as the female supervisors, a female supervisor may still be able to prove her 
claim, depending on the form the harassment takes.  Take, for example, pornography.  Deborah 
Tannen has argued that the use of pornography to harass women is different from the hazing 
male subordinates may give a new male boss.299a The mere existence of a woman with power is 
a challenge to masculine control of the workplace.   
Thus, when a female supervisor is harassed by a subordinate and the harassment takes the 
form of sexualized, gender-role-enforcing behavior, a court should draw the inference that 
harassment is because of sex without requiring additional evidence. 299b Although I agree with 
other commentators that courts should not focus exclusively on sexualized behavior, this 
behavior carries a sufficient sting such that courts may properly presume the behavior is 
“because of sex.”  Conduct that seeks to remind a female supervisor that she does not deserve the 
position because she is a woman is behavior because of sex.  Therefore, conduct aimed at 
undermining the authority and power of a female supervisor should carry evidentiary weight that 
the conduct is motivated “because of” the sex of the supervisor.   
 
D.  Severe or Pervasive to Alter the Terms or Conditions of Employment 
In order to bring sexual harassment without a loss of an employment benefit within the 
purview of the statute, the conduct must effect a “term or condition” of employment.300 Thus, 
the fourth element of a hostile environment claim is that the conduct at issue was sufficiently 
 
297 Id.
298 Again, the social science theories of harassment fail to provide an explanation for women harassing higher-status 
men, unless the higher-status men are of color or effeminate.  See, e.g., Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 43-44, 50-
52; Craig R. Waldo, Jennifer L. Berdahl & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Are Men Sexually Harassed? If So, by Whom?, 22 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 59, 72-73 (1998). 
299 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (unlawful employment action present 
where sex is motivating factor). 
299a Tannen, supra note 101a, at 87.  “[Pornography, or any reference to sex, reminds the new manager that she is a 
woman . . . and that sex can be used as a format for physical attack.”  Id. 
299b Drawing this inference should serve to counteract difficulties caused by Oncale’s interpretation of “because of” 
sex.  See Leeser, supra note 113, at 1767. 
300 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).   
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severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.301 In Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that this fourth element has both an objective 
and subjective component.302 To prove this element, a plaintiff must establish that a reasonable 
person would find the conduct at issue sufficiently offensive to alter the terms or conditions of 
plaintiff’s employment.303 In addition, the plaintiff must establish she was subjectively 
offended.304 
In Harris, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not suffer actual psychological 
harm to bring a claim.305 Rather, the Court stated that a fact finder must consider the “totality of 
the circumstances” to determine whether the conduct at issue was sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.306 The Court offered a 
non-exhaustive list of factors for the fact finder to consider, including “the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 
offensive utterance;” whether the conduct “unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 
performance;” and the “effect [of the conduct] on the employee’s psychological well-being.”307 
The Court added to this list in the Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc. decision.308 In 
discussing “all the circumstances” to be considered under the objective part of the severe or 
pervasive requirement, the Court noted the importance of the social context “in which particular 
behavior occurs and is experienced by the target.”309 
301 Every circuit requires a version of the “severe or pervasive” element.  See, e.g., Pomales v. Celulares Telefonica, 
Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2006); Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., 445 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 2006); Clegg v. 
Falcon Plastics, Inc., 174 F. App’x 18 at *24 (3d Cir. 2006); Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 2006); 
McKinnis v. Crescent Guardian, Inc., No. 05-30728, 2006 WL 1880364, at *2 (5th Cir. July 7, 2006); Randolph v. 
Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006); Valentine v. City of Chi., 452 F.3d 670, 681-82 (7th 
Cir. 2006); Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Coop., 446 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2006); Walpole v. City of 
Mesa, 162 F App’x 715, 716 (9th Cir. 2006); Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 175 F. App’x 207, 210 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Mitchell v. Pope, No. 05-14927, 2006 WL 1976011, at *1 (11th Cir. July 14, 2006); Lutkewitte v. Gonzales, 436 
F.3d 248, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Pope v. U.S. Postal Serv., 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997).   
302 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). 
303 Id. at 21.  The make-up of the hypothetical “reasonable person” in a hostile environment case has been the 
subject of much scholarly debate.  See, e.g., Saba Ashraf, Note, The Reasonableness of the “Reasonable Woman” 
Standard: An Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483, 496-504 (1992); Bernstein, supra note 119; Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a 
Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854 (1993); Franke, supra note 111, at 747-52; Elizabeth L. Schoenfelt et al., Reasonable 
Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does It Matter?, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 633 (2002).  For some 
time in the 1990s, there was a trend among some courts to adopt the reasonable woman test.  See Ellison v. Brady, 
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (beginning reasonable woman trend whereby plaintiffs were required to prove hostile 
environment claims by showing “conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment”).  When the Supreme 
Court handed down the Harris decision, it avoided any explicit discussion of this question.  Rather, the Court 
discussed the “reasonable person” in its articulation of the severe or pervasive requirement without overtly rejecting 
the “reasonable woman” test.  See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25. 
304 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
305 Id.
306 Id. at 23. 
307 Id.  
308 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998). 
309 Id.  The Court explained that the actual social impact of behavior in the workplace is dependent on several 
“surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of 
the words used or the physical acts performed.”  Id.  Thus, both common sense and the appropriate degree of 
responsiveness to social context will allow the courts and juries to “distinguish between simple teasing or 
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Similar to the other elements of the hostile environment claim, the severe or pervasive 
standard has received its fair share of criticism.  First, because of the objective standard 
embedded in this requirement, the debate over the make-up of “reasonable person” applies to this 
fourth element.310 Second, the severe or pervasive standard places a significant amount of 
harassing conduct beyond the reach of the law.311 Third, this standard invites courts to substitute 
their own judgment for that of the community.  Professor Beiner notes that courts often declare 
that no reasonable person could find the behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive, thereby taking 
the cases away from the jury.312 By removing cases from the jury, “judges are impeding the 
development of a community standard” of what is unacceptable sexual harassment.313 Finally, 
the inclusion by the Oncale court of the “social context” as one of the circumstances to be 
considered engendered much criticism.314 
The question then for a contra-power harassment case is whether the organizational status of 
the harasser vis-a-vis the victim is a “circumstance” which should be considered.  Although 
 
roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position 
would find severely hostile or abusive.”  Id. at 82.  
310 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 116, at 1223-24.  Abrams advocates retaining the method of assessing the 
sufficiency of the pervasive requirement from the standpoint of a reasonable person.  Id. at 1223.  Yet Abrams 
proposes that the reasonable person standard should be subject to an “elaboration,” where the term “reasonable” 
should be understood as characterizing a “person with a solid base of political knowledge regarding sexual 
harassment.”  Id. at 1224.  Abrams explains, “such knowledge includes understanding the ways in which sexism has 
operated on women in the workplace,” and also “understanding the ways in which a sex and gender hierarchy 
impinges on nonconforming women and men.”  Id.  The effects of sex-based struggles in the workplace and the use 
of sexual harassment “as a means of male control and masculine normative entrenchment encapsulates many of the 
understandings that this reasonable person should have.”  Id.  See also Franke, supra note 111, at 752.  Franke 
argues that while Abrams’s proposed standard has merit, it should be taken one step further.  Id.  The reasonable 
person must be informed on the “underlying causes of women’s inequality, including the sexual harassment of men 
who deviate from a hetero-patriarchal script.”  Id.  Thus, Franke argues that the “reasonable person be educated in 
and sensitive to the ways in which sexism can and does limit workplace options for all persons, male or female.”  Id.   
311 See Johnson, supra note 15, at 134-42 (arguing that continued use of “severe or pervasive” requirement by 
Supreme Court has encouraged lower courts to continue demanding high level of offensive conduct from hostile 
environment plaintiffs, effectively tolerating high degree of opprobrious conduct); e. christi cunningham, Preserving 
Normal Heterosexual Male Fantasy: The “Severe or Pervasive” Missed-Interpretation of Sexual Harassment in the 
Absence of a Tangible Job Consequence, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 228-30 (1999) (arguing that while “nothing in 
Title VII legitimates limiting individuals to a certain degree of equality and no more,” severe or pervasive 
requirement protects “fantasy of normal male sexuality”  by excluding from reach of Title VII conduct which 
propagates inequality yet is considered “normal” by male heterosexuality standards); Heather L. Kleinschmidt, 
Note, Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive: Aligning the Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment 
Causes of Action, 80 IND. L.J. 1119, 1123-29 (2005) (comparing practical application of “severe or pervasive” 
requirement in racial versus sexual harassment cases, and arguing that in latter claims courts, particularly Seventh 
Circuit, have developed more stringent “severe and pervasive” standard making it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
establish hostile working environment). 
312 Beiner, supra note 79, at 21.   
313 Id. at 30. 
314 Many commentators have soundly criticized the “social context” portion of the Oncale decision.  See, e.g.,
Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 
515-30 (2002); Melissa K. Hughes, Note, Through the Looking Glass: Racial Jokes, Social Context, and the 
Reasonable Person in Hostile Work Environment Analysis, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1456-82 (2003); Rebecca K. 
Lee, Pink, White and Blue: Class Assumptions in the Judicial Interpretations of Title VII Hostile Environment 
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some of the contra-power decisions simply recite the allegations and hold that the conduct either 
was or was not severe or pervasive enough,315 other courts explicitly discuss the contra-power 
nature of the harassment.316 These courts expressed doubts about the intimidating nature of the 
working environment given the contra-power nature of the facts.  For example, in Kirkland v. 
Brinias, the court found that the plaintiffs were “subjected to sexual harassment on the job.”317 
However, the court diminished the import of the harassment.  “[U]nlike the situation in the 
typical harassment case, the unwelcome behavior came from a subordinate, not a supervisor.”318 
The contra-power relationship was the “most important” fact to the court in Odom v. St. Louis 
 
315 For decisions finding that the requirement is met, see Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 
196616, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000) (holding that after considering all circumstances, “complaint contains 
sufficient allegations of a single episode severe enough to create an actionable hostile work environment”); Lewis v. 
Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996) (noting that if 
harassment complained of is proven, which involved “continuing pattern of degrading remarks, requests for sex or 
sexual contact and attempted and actual contact in the most intimate areas,” would be both “sufficiently pervasive 
and severe to constitute a hostile environment”); Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672, 683 (S.D. Tex. 
1995) (holding requirement was satisfied when plaintiff’s subordinate “instructed contractors not to deal” with 
plaintiff and verbally harassed her as such behavior “could have impaired Humphreys’ ability to do her job and 
altered her working conditions as a building manager”); Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266, 273 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994) (ruling that although only one of incidents complained of could be considered as blatantly “of a sexual 
nature,” “totality of the circumstances” show plaintiff met her burden in proving she was subject to unwelcome 
harassment due to her gender and that employer’s conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter conditions of 
employment); Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 929-30 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (stating that 
“combination of sexual overtures, demeaning comments, and physical abuse” aimed at plaintiff created environment 
that adversely affected her ability to perform her job and her psychological well-being).  For decisions finding that 
the requirement is not met, see Pfahl v. Synthes (USA), 13 F. App’x 832, 835 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that totality 
of conduct involving four allegations did not amount to abusive working environment); Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 
288 F. Supp. 2d 148, 160 (D.P.R. 2003) (stating that there was no specific act directed at plaintiff and therefore no 
evidence of severe or pervasive conduct); Johnson v. Prof’l Servs. Group, No. 4-93-1197, 1996 WL 33324813, at *6 
(D. Minn. April 17, 1996) (holding requirement was not met where plaintiff was viewed as distrustful by 
subordinates and subjected to occasional uncivil behavior, as Title VII does not protect against such “‘snubs, 
criticisms, and discourteous conduct’”); Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1501 (W.D. Mo. 1989) 
(“Perkins has failed to satisfy her burden that the few credible unwelcome incidents reasonably affected a term, 
condition or privilege of her employment.” (alteration in original)); Otterstedt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 96 M.S.P.R. 688, 
694 (2004) (noting that incidents complained of did not involve conduct that could be designated as abusive, severe 
or pervasive so as to constitute harassment, even when considered as whole).  One court, although denying summary 
judgment for the employer, questioned whether the plaintiff was subjectively offended by the conduct. See Mingo 
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884, 899-900 (N.D. Ill. 2001).  Several decisions do not discuss the 
requirement.  See Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 
199 (5th Cir. 1997); Wilson v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1992); Needham v. BI, Inc., No. 
00 C 1550, 2001 WL 558144 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001); Malladi v. Brown, 987 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Ala. 1997); 
Wilson v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Tex. 1991). 
316 See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1995); Erebia v. Chrysler 
Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1985); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 778 (5th Cir. 
1983); Odom v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (E.D. Mo. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 
2000); Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 698 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), aff’d, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991). 
317 Kirkland, 741 F. Supp. at 698. 
318 Id.  The court found for the defendants because although “some misconduct was of a sexually offensive nature 
that would create a hostile and intimidating working environment for a reasonable person under those 
circumstances, there is no hint that it had any harmful psychological effect on the plaintiffs.”  Id.  Kirkland was 
decided prior to the Supreme Court’s Harris opinion wherein the Court held that psychological harm is not 
necessary for a successful hostile environment claim.  See supra note 189. 
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Community College.319 The court noted that the plaintiff was the one in a position of authority 
and could determine the conditions of employment for the subordinate.320 Because, at times, the 
plaintiff was solely in charge of the office, the court held a “subordinate employee could not 
have created an environment so pervasively hostile or abusive that it would have affected a term 
or condition of a reasonable supervisor’s employment.”321 Similarly, the court in DeAngelis v. 
El Paso Municipal Police Officers Ass’n opined that the plaintiff’s Title VII case was not 
compelling.322 Factoring in the decision was that the plaintiff was not “preyed upon by a 
superior,” but was in a “command position” herself.323 Thus, the totality of circumstances did 
not equate to a severe or pervasive hostile environment.324 
The plaintiff’s position of authority also contributed to a finding for the defendant in Hill 
v. K-Mart Corp.325 Hill was a black female supervisor who brought Title VII and §1981 charges 
against her employer, K-Mart, for racial and sexual harassment by subordinates.326 One 
subordinate who made a racial slur was a white female and the other was of an unidentified race 
and gender.327 Hill also complained about a white male subordinate who harassed her, but the 
court noted that this subordinate treated all supervisors with equal disrespect regardless of race or 
gender.328 Of major importance to the decision was the fact that the two racial incidents did not 
significantly impact Hill’s position of authority.329 The court was convinced that Hill “stood 
above” the remarks and that her position suffered nothing as a result.330 Thus, it found that the 
record of harassment was not severe or pervasive enough.331 
One of the most straightforward discussions of the interaction between contra-power 
harassment and the “severe or pervasive” requirement is from a race discrimination case.  In 
Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., Judge Kennedy wrote a strong dissenting opinion that 
questioned the ability of a subordinate to create a hostile environment.332 The dissent thought the 
evidence of racial hostility was insufficient to support a claim.333 At any single time during 
Erebia’s tenure, depending on the department, he was subject to racial slurs by a single white 
male subordinate.334 The dissent opined that Erebria’s claim that a single subordinate making 
 
319 See Odom, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (stating that contra-power situation “differs drastically from the common 
situation where a superior creates or fosters an environment so harmful or threatening to a subordinate” that it 
affects term or condition of employment). 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
322 DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1995). 
323 See id. (implying that only when harassing conduct is committed by superior can such actions be “interpreted as 
an abuse of power” against target). 
324 Id. 
325 Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 778 (5th Cir. 1983). 
326 Id. at 776-77. 
327 Id. at 777. 
328 Id. at 778. 
329 See id. (stating that “only evidence of a negative effect was Hill’s conclusional statement that the two episodes 
placed her in a bad light” and that after examining record as whole, Hill’s tenure after slurs was still “successful and 
indicated no lack of respect or dignity”). 
330 Id.
331 Id.  See also Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d  884, 899-900 (questioning whether plaintiff was 
subjectively offended but denying summary judgment to employer due to genuine issue of material fact). 
332 Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
333 Id. at 1260. 
334 Id. 
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racial slurs “dominated the foreman’s working environment” was the “weakest case of all.”335 
It continued by showing examples of other cases where the hostile environment was more 
widespread and stated that “the bigotry of one subordinate does not poison the working 
atmosphere to the extent it was poisoned in these cases.”336 
It is this very attitude which necessitates a focus on the contra-power claim and a change 
to the “totality of the circumstances” approach.  Courts should not consider the organizational 
relationship between the harasser and harassee at this point in the analysis. Rather, courts should 
consider whether the behavior at issue is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s 
working environment without regard to the organizational status of the harasser.  If it is, then the 
court should not underestimate the effect that harassment may have simply because the 
harasser(s) is a subordinate.  If anything, social science tells us that contra-power harassment is 
less welcome and more upsetting behavior than “typical” cases.337 
This change will not adversely impact claims of women harassed by supervisors or co-
workers.  First, my proposal has no impact on quid pro quo claims.  A court engages in an 
analysis of the “totality of the circumstances” only for a hostile environment claim.  An 
employee who suffers a loss of a tangible employment benefit at the hands of her supervisor has 
a quid pro quo claim.  Thus, a quid pro quo claim may only be brought by an employee harassed 
by a supervisor.  The organizational status of the parties is the heart of the claim.  Second, for 
claims of a hostile environment created by co-workers, the plaintiff suffers no detriment by 
ignoring the organizational status of the actors involved.  The only potential detriment lies in 
claims for hostile environments created by a supervisor.  However, the organizational status of 
the parties would have no effect on a finding of pervasiveness.  Because courts interpret 
pervasiveness as “frequency” – something either is pervasive or it is not.  Thus, the only scenario 
wherein setting aside the organizational status of the parties would have a potential negative 
effect on the plaintiff is in determining the “severity” of the conduct engaged in by a supervisor.   
The standard is that the conduct be severe or pervasive; it need not be both.  Thus, a plaintiff 
should be able to prove that the behavior meets this standard without a discussion of the 
organizational status of the parties. 
By setting aside the hierarchical relationship of the parties, contra-power claims should 
receive greater attention from the courts without negatively impacting other hostile environment 
claims.  The only place the organizational status of the parties should be considered is in the final 
element – employer liability. 
 
V.    Employer Liability 
 
Employer liability, or the lack thereof, is one of the most common reasons for a plaintiff 
to lose in her sexual harassment claim.338 Title VII proscribes certain employment practices of 
 
335 See id. at 1260-61.  The dissent compares Erebria’s claim to other situations involving harassment, arguing that 
racial harassment that is “directed at an employee by a single supervisor can sufficiently poison the employee’s 
working atmosphere, since a supervisor can dominate the workplace with respect to his subordinate.”   Id. at 1260.  
The dissent further argues that attitudes of several co-workers can additionally “control one’s working atmosphere.”  
Id. 
336 Id. at 1261. 
337 Wayne, supra note 16, at 319. 
338 Juliano & Schwab, supra note 178, at 589. 
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“employers.”339 As Justice Marshall noted, most employment decisions are carried out by 
individuals.340 Anticipating this, Congress included “agents” within the definition of 
“employer.”341 Thus, the plaintiff must show some reason why the employer, as an entity, 
should be liable for the actions of its agents.  The correct standard to hold an employer liable has 
been much debated by academics and caused much confusion in the courts.342 
This confusion was initially caused by the Supreme Court’s failure to provide definitive 
standards in its Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson decision.343 In Meritor, the Court explicitly 
“decline[d] the parties’ invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liability.”344 Noting that 
Congress defined employer to include any agent of the employer, the Court concluded that 
Congress intended “to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under 
Title VII are to be held responsible.”345 The Court therefore rejected the Court of Appeals and 
the EEOC Guidelines, which held employers absolutely liable for sexual harassment by 
supervisors regardless of the notice the employer received.346 For the same reasons, the Court 
held that a lack of notice to the employer does not insulate the employer from liability.347 The 
Court specifically held that the existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against 
discrimination along with the victim’s failure to invoke that procedure does not insulate an 
employer from liability.348 Without further explication, the Court stated that agency principles 
should apply to determine liability.349 
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment but wrote separately on the question of 
employer liability.350 Justice Marshall discussed the EEOC Guidelines, which he believed are 
entitled to great deference.351 Under the Guidelines, an employer would be liable for the actions 
of its supervisory employees regardless of the notice given to the employer.352 For sexual 
 
339 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).  For a discussion of the unlawful employment practices proscribed by Title VII, 
see infra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.    
340 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (Marshall, J, concurring) (“An employer can act only through 
individual supervisors and employees; discrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a formal vote of a 
corporation’s board of directors.”). 
341 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (2006). 
342 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785 (1998) (“Since our decision in Meritor, Courts of Appeals 
have struggled to derive manageable standards to govern employer liability for hostile environment harassment 
perpetrated by supervisory employees.”). 
343 Meritor, 477 U.S. 57. 
344 Id. at 72.  The Court also seemed reluctant to issue a definitive employer liability rule based on the fact that the 
“debate over the appropriate standard for employer liability has a rather abstract quality about it given the state of 
the record in this case.”  Id.  The Court pointed out that they were presently unsure of whether defendant Taylor had 
“made any sexual advances toward respondent at all, let alone whether those advances were unwelcome, whether 
they were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a condition of employment,” and finally, if they were so pervasive and 
continuous as to imply constructive knowledge on the employer’s part.  Id.
345 Id.  
346 Id.
347 Id. 
348 Id. The Court suggested that the facts before it provided the very reason why the employer may still be liable.  
The nondiscrimination policy of the Bank did not address sexual harassment specifically, and the grievance 
procedure required employees to complain to their supervisor first.  Given that the plaintiff’s supervisor was the 
alleged harasser, “it is not altogether surprising that respondent failed to invoke the procedure and report her 
grievance to him.”  Id. at 73. 
349 Id. at 72. 




harassment perpetrated by co-workers, the employer would be responsible for acts where the 
employer “knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took 
immediate and appropriate corrective action.”353 Justice Marshall rejected the argument that 
hostile environment cases require notice to the employer before liability attached whereas cases 
with a tangible job detriment to the plaintiff trigger absolute liability.354 “No such requirement 
appears in the statute, and no such requirement can coherently be drawn from the law of 
agency.”355 Justice Marshall would therefore craft a rule wherein the employer is liable for the 
sexual harassment by a supervisor regardless of notice to the employer. 
 
A.  Current State of the Law
After twelve years of disagreement amongst the Circuits as to the results of these agency 
principles, the Supreme Court issued a pair of cases that clarified the standards for employer 
liability in cases involving sexual harassment by a supervisor.356 In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable 
for sexual harassment by a supervisor where the harassment results in tangible employment 
action.357 For cases without a tangible employment action but rather involving a hostile 
environment created by the actions of a supervisor, the employer is vicariously liable but retains 
a two-part affirmative defense.358 To avoid liability, the employer must prove “(a) that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”359 
The Court based its decisions on agency principles found in the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency, the holding of Meritor and the inclusion of damages in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.  
Because the definition of “employer” in Title VII includes “agents,” the Court turned to the 
 
353 Id. at 74 (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R  §§ 1604.11(c), (d) (1985)).   
354 Id. at 76-77.  Justice Marshall argued that the responsibilities of supervisors “do not begin and end with the 
power to hire, fire, and discipline employees,” yet extend to both the “day-to-day supervision of the work 
environment and with ensuring a safe, productive workplace.”  Id. at 76.  Justice Marshall further argued that there 
is no justification as to why an “abuse of the latter authority should have different consequences than abuse of the 
former,” as in both situations “it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit 
the wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer’s authority that he is 
able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates.”  Id. at 76-77. 
355 Id. at 77. 
356 Burlington Indus, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
357 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790 (citing Meritor,
477 U.S. at 70-71 for same provision).  The continued demarcation between cases with tangible employment actions 
(quid pro quo cases) and those without has placed great weight on the definition of “tangible employment action.”   
358 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
359 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.  The Court in both decisions notes that the affirmative 
defense is subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.      
“While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not 
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances 
may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.  The Court also adds “while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the 
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use 
any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy 
the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
807-08.  See also Ryan P. Harley, Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace – Prompt and Remedial Action as a 
Measure of Employer Liability Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 533 (2005) 
(discussing fact patterns that meet, or fail to meet, affirmative defense).      
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Restatement.  The Court considered the various methods of imposing liability under the 
Restatement section 219.360 The Court rejected imposing liability under a “scope of 
employment” test, holding that generally, “sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct 
within the scope of employment.”361 Rather, the harassing supervisor acts out of personal 
motives and/or motives antithetical to the interests of the employer.362 
The Court then considered the various methods for imposing liability under section 
219(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.363 Section 219(2) describes those instances in 
which an employer is liable for acts committed by an employee acting outside of the scope of 
employment.364 The section embodies four principles: the employer intended the conduct of the 
consequences; the employer was negligent or reckless; the conduct violated a non-delegable duty 
of the employer; or the servant purported to speak on behalf of the principal and there was 
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of 
the agency relationship.365 The Court rejected the first (direct and indirect liability) and the third 
(non-delegable duty) as irrelevant to the particular case.366 
Turning to the question of negligence, the Court found that an employer may be liable for 
harassment, although outside of the scope of employment, where the employer’s own negligence 
is a cause of the harassment.367 Further, the Court found that negligence is a “minimum standard 
of employer liability under Title VII” wherein an employer is liable if it knew or should have 
 
360 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).   
361 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (stating that “master is subject to liability for the torts 
of his servants committed while acting in the scope of employment”).  See also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755-57; 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-801.  Although the Ellerth decision rejects liability under the “scope of employment” 
test, the Court did note that “[t]here are instances, of course, where a supervisor engages in unlawful discrimination 
with the purpose, mistaken or otherwise, to serve the employer.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757.  The Faragher opinion 
contains a longer discussion of the “scope of employment” basis for imposing liability.  The Faragher opinion notes 
that the cases holding that sexual harassment falls outside of the scope of employment are “in tension” with those 
cases outside of the Title VII context where the scope of employment has been defined broadly.  Faragher, 524 U.S. 
at 794.  Some courts have included sexual assaults within the scope of employment.  Id. at 795.  The Court 
considered whether the costs of sexual harassment should be placed on the employer through a broad definition of 
scope of employment rather than on the employee.  However, the Court found two reasons not to do so: 
congressional intent and distinction between co-worker harassment and supervisor harassment.  Id. at 798-800.  
First, the Court found that there was no evidence that Congress intended courts to ignore the distinction between acts 
falling within the scope and actions falling outside the scope.  Id. at 798.  Because acts of harassment would 
generally be defined as outside of the scope of harassment, the Court chose to apply the traditional agency 
principles.  Id. at 799.  Second, the Court noted the lower courts, by employing a negligence standard for co-worker 
harassment, have determined harassment to be outside the scope of co-workers’ duties as well.  Id. If the scope of 
employment reasoning was used to require the employer to bear the costs of harassment for supervisors, the same 
logic would apply to co-worker harassment.  Id. at 800.  Therefore, the Court rejected the scope of employment as a 
basis for employer liability for supervisory harassment.  Id. at 801. 
362 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 794. 
363 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-64.  See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801-07.  In the Faragher opinion, the Court 
focused more on a specific evaluation of the use of § 219(2)(d) as a standard for imposing liability on employers as 
opposed to a comprehensive examination of all four standards within § 219(2).  Id. 
364 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958). 
365 Id. 
366 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.  Note, however, that the Court did not exclude the possibility that some supervisors who 
harass will be of sufficiently high rank in the company, making him or her the employer’s alter ego.  Id. As such, 
the employer will be indirectly liable for the harassment. Id. 
367 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-59. 
42
known about the conduct and failed to stop it.368 However, the Court went on to consider 
whether a stricter standard should apply. 
The last possibility under section 219(2) involves vicarious liability for intentional torts 
committed when the employee uses apparent authority or when the employee “‘was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.’”369 The Ellerth Court quickly 
rejected the apparent authority theory because “a supervisor’s harassment involves the misuse of 
actual power, not the false impression of its existence.”370 Thus, the Court grounded its decision 
in the “aided in the agency relation” rule. 
The Court noted that all torts in the workplace are aided by the existence of the agency 
relationship because the relationship allows for proximity and contact with potential victims.371 
However, if liability depended solely on this formulation, then the employer would be liable for 
all harassment committed by supervisors and co-workers.372 Therefore, the Court held that there 
must be something more than the employment relation itself to impose vicarious liability.373 It 
found that “something more” in those cases where the supervisor takes a tangible employment 
action.374 Where there is a tangible employment action, there is a direct economic injury and an 
official act of the company, often reviewed by higher-level supervisors.375 This injury could not 
have been inflicted in the absence of the agency relation and only a supervisor can cause this sort 
of injury.376 Therefore, in regard to the requirements of the aided in the agency standard, the 
Court held, “its requirements will always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment 
action against a subordinate.  In that instance, it would be implausible to interpret agency 
principles to allow an employer to escape liability . . . .”377 
Turning to those cases where there is no tangible employment action, the Court found the 
aided in the agency relationship more difficult to apply.  A supervisor’s harassing conduct is that 
much more menacing due to the supervisor’s power and authority.378 In that way, a supervisor is 
always aided in the agency relationship.379 However, some acts of harassment by a supervisor 
could be the same acts as those of a co-employee.380 The Court referred to this aspect of the 
 
368 Id. at 759. 
369 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958)).  See also Faragher, 524 
U.S. at 801 (quoting same provision).     
370 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.  The Court held that in the unusual case of a false impression that the actor was indeed a 
supervisor, the victim’s mistake must be a reasonable one.  Id. 
371 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.  “In a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious 
objective by the existence of the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may afford a captive pool of 
potential victims.”  Id.   
372 Id. (noting that this is “result enforced by neither the EEOC nor any court of appeals to have considered the 
issue”). 
373 Id. 
374 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.  The Court defined tangible employment action as a “significant change in employment 
status, such as hiring, firing, failure to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change in benefits.”  Id. at 761. 
375 Id. at 762.   
376 See id. (explaining further that employment actions that are tangible “fall within the special province of the 
supervisor,” as supervisors are empowered by their companies as “distinct class of agent[s] to make economic 
decisions affecting other employees” under their control).    
377 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-63. 
378 Id. at 763; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (noting that “victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing the 
whistle on a superior”). 
379 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802.   
380 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763. 
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aided in the agency relationship as a “developing feature of agency law” and “hesitate[d] to 
render a definitive explanation of our understanding of the standard . . . .”381 The Faragher 
Court approved in a general manner of the imposition of vicarious liability for misuse of 
supervisory authority.  However, the Court noted that it must “square” this principle with the 
decision in Meritor that an employer is not automatically liable.382 Further, Congress had not 
altered the Meritor rule, but rather made significant changes to Title VII while cognizant of 
Meritor’s precedent.383 The Faragher Court determined that there were two possibilities to 
reconcile these two principles.384 Under the first possibility, the plaintiff would need to show 
proof that the harassing supervisor engaged in some sort of affirmative invocation of supervisory 
authority.385 The Court rejected this approach as too difficult to determine, not practical and 
litigation-producing.386 The second alternative, and the one the Court adopted, is the creation of 
the two-part affirmative defense.387 Both the Faragher and Ellerth decisions summoned the 
goals of Title VII in support of the affirmative defense for employers.  Title VII is intended to 
avoid harm through the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance 
procedures.388 Further, limiting employer liability could “encourage employees to report 
harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive,” which would serve Title VII’s 
deterrent purpose.389 The Court limited this holding to cases involving “an actionable hostile 
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the 
employee.”390 
Although superficially resolving the debate about employer liability, the 
Faragher/Ellerth standard has earned its fair share of criticism.391 Joanna Grossman, an astute 
critic of employer liability standards, refers to these cases as a “victory for the misguided culture 
of compliance.”392 Employers, according to Grossman, may insulate themselves from liability 
 
381 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.  For a more expansive reading of the aided in the agency standard, see Carle, supra note 
27a, at 91 (arguing that some co-workers possess informal power vested in them by employers to alter the terms and 
conditions of employment). 
382 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804.  See also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (explaining that they are “bound by our holding in 
Meritor that agency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment”).  
383 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 n.4; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-64. 
384 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. 
385 Id. 
386 Id. at 804-05. 
387 Id. at 805. 
388 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. 
389 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. 
390 Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.  Justice Thomas, with Justice Scalia joining, dissented.  See Ellerth, 524 
U.S. at 766-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Faragher, 534 U.S. at 810-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas 
described the standards for employer liability for racial hostile environment cases as solely that of negligence.  
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 768.  He argued that the standards for racial hostile environments and hostile environments 
based on sex should be the same and that the standard should be a negligence standard.  Id. at 769-71.  He criticized 
the majority’s holding as lacking support from agency principles and as violating the premise of Meritor that 
employers are not automatically liable.  Id. at 771-74. 
391 One student note suggested that the decisions would make the grant of summary judgment for employers a more 
difficult decision because the standards are so fact intensive.  See Tara Kaesbier, Note, Employer Liability in 
Supervisor Sexual Harassment Cases: The Supreme Court Finally Speaks, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 203, 223-24 (1999).  
Cf. Carle, supra note 27a, at 93-94 (informal survey shows plaintiffs are losing sexual harassment cases at the 
summary judgment stage based on the assertion of the affirmative defense).  
392 Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual 
Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3 (2003) (arguing through article for abolition of affirmative defense, 
increase in availability of punitive damages, and creation of individual supervisory liability for harassment).  See 
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without making a dent in the prevalence of sexual harassment.393 Another commentator has 
argued that the liability standards have caused employers to discharge those accused of sexual 
harassment, leading to a “paradox” of liability for employers.393a 
B.  The Negligence Standard
Although the Faragher and Ellerth decisions did not explicitly set forth a standard for co-
worker harassment, the Supreme Court did describe negligence as the “minimum” standard 
under Title VII.394 Most lower courts, pre- and post-Faragher/Ellerth, apply a negligence 
standard to co-worker harassment cases.395 In its most basic formulation, an employer may be 
held liable for harassment by a co-worker based on its own negligence when the employer either 
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to stop it.396 This test examines the 
same workplace factors as the affirmative defense developed in Ellerth and Faragher.397 
However, under the negligence standard, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove these elements 
rather than on the employer.397a 
The lower courts have stated the test as whether the employer had either actual or 
constructive notice of the harassment and whether the employer failed to take prompt remedial 
action.398 In addition, in some jurisdictions, a plaintiff may show that the employer provided no 
reasonable avenue for complaint.399 Actual notice does not require the plaintiff to follow the 
reporting procedures as long as a high-level management official or someone with the power to 
 
also Grossman, supra note 15, at 719-35 (criticizing Supreme Court and lower courts’ interpretation of Title VII as 
too lenient with regard to employer liability). 
393 Grossman, supra note 392, at 3. 
393a Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Lebyrinth: The Employers’ Paradox in Responding to Hostile 
Environment Sexual Harassment – A Proposed Way Out, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1517 (March 1999). Franklin 
proposes a set system of offenses and punishments in order to put employees on notice.  She advocates a dual 
responsibility approach under which all supervisory personnel have the duty to report complaints and all potentially 
harassing conduct.  All employees must report all potentially harassing conduct or be foreclosed from later raising a 
complaint.  Id. at 1524.  Franklin balances her requirement of complete reporting with the requirement on the 
employer that all complaints are taken seriously and the consequences are known.  Id. at 1593. 
394 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. 
395 See infra notes 398-410 and accompanying text.  See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.  As part of its argument 
concerning why sexual harassment should not be considered within the scope of employment, the court states that 
the district courts and courts of appeals thus far have uniformly judged “employer liability for co-worker harassment 
under a negligence standard.”  Id.  
396 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. 
397 Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.  The EEOC regulations hold an employer responsible for co-worker 
harassment in the workplace where “the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have 
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.”  29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(d). 
397a See, e.g., Swinton v. Potomac, 270 F.3d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 2001) (same facts relevant to negligence and 
vicarious liability claims although the party bearing the burden of proof differs); Wilson v. Tulsa J.C., 164 F.3d 534, 
541 (10th Cir. 1998) (same). 
398 See, e.g., Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 794-95 (8th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 
360 F.3d 1103, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004); Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2001); Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 332 (4th 
Cir. 1999); Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1999); Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 
1229 (10th Cir. 1998). 
399 See, e.g., Feingold v. N.Y., 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004); Susko v. Romano’s Macaroni Grill, 142 F. Supp. 
2d 333, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Badlam v. Reynolds Metals Co., 46 F. Supp. 2d 187, 197 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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remedy the problem has actual notice of the harassment.400 In some cases, courts have found 
notice to the employer when the notice came from someone other than the target of the 
harassment.400a However, if the employee does follow the terms of the policy, then the 
employer’s notice is established.401 Courts have found constructive notice of the harassment 
where high-level management officials should have gained knowledge of the harassment had 
they acted with reasonable care,402 or when the harassment was so open and pervasive that a 
reasonable employer would have been aware of it.403 For an employer to be charged with 
constructive knowledge, the harassment must be greater than that required for an actionable 
hostile environment claim.  That is, it must be more than severe or pervasive; it must equate to a 
“campaign” of harassment.404 
As for the prompt remedial action prong, the employer’s response, in general, must 
simply be reasonable.405 Courts decline to find negligence on the employer’s part when the 
employer implements remedial measures unless the remedial measures exhibit a high level of 
indifference as to the amount to discrimination.406 The reasonableness of the remedial measures 
depends on the ability to stop the current harassment, to deter future harassers, the alternatives 
available to the employer, and the amount of time that elapsed between the notice and the 
initiation of remedial measures.407 Thus, courts have found the employer not liable when the 
employer takes prompt action in response to the complaint, gives a strong warning to the 
harassers,408 transfers or suspends the harasser,409 and/or implements training for the entire 
department.410 
With these two standards in mind, I turn now to the contra-power cases. 
 
C.  Employer Liability in Contra-power Cases
400 See Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 952-53 (7th Cir. 2005); Wanchik v. Great Lakes Health Plan, Inc., 
6 F. App’x 252, 264 (6th Cir 2001); Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1999).  Often there is 
a question as to whether a particular official who received notice of the harassment is of sufficient rank so that the 
notice may be imputed to the employer.  For a discussion of the tests employed by the courts, see Stanford Edward 
Purser, Note: Young v. Bayer Corp.: When is Notice of Sexual Harassment to an Employee Notice to the Employer?,
1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 909 (1998) (arguing that courts should adopt a test for notice which considers who within the 
company plaintiff reasonably believed had the power to respond to sexual harassment).   
400a See, e.g., Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996)(notification by plaintiff’s 
boyfriend sufficient notice to employer). 
401 See, e.g., Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, 222 F.3d 886, 889-90 (11th Cir. 2000); Collier v. Ram Partners, Inc., 
159 F. Supp. 2d 889, 900 (D. Md. 2001). 
402 See, e.g., Glover v. NMC Homecare, Inc., 13 F. App’x 896, 902 (10th Cir. 2001); P. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 102 
F. Supp. 2d 132, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
403 See, e.g., Bishop v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 650, 668 (E.D. Pa. 1999); King v. The Finish 
Line, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 987, 993 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
404 See Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 776 (10th Cir. 2000). 
405 See Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 329 (5th Cir. 2004); Mandy v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 
49 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1108-09 (E.D. Wis. 1999). 
406 See, e.g., Martin v. Boeing-Oak Ridge Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 863, 874 (E.D. Tenn. 2002). 
407 See Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 702 (8th Cir. 1999); Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 338 F. Supp. 2d 
1008, 1034 (S.D. Iowa 2004). 
408 See, e.g., Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., 361 F.3d 1021, 1030 (7th Cir. 2004); Henderson v. Heartland Press, 
Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1000 (N.D. Iowa 1999). 
409 See, e.g., Stepheny v. Brooklyn Hebrew Sch. for Special Children, 356 F. Supp. 2d 248, 265-66 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Lowe v. Unifi, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 773, 784 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
410 See, e.g., Robinson v. Valmont Indus., 238 F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 2001); Wieland v. Dep’t of Transp., 98 F. 
Supp. 2d 1010, 1023 (N.D. Ind. 2000). 
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Of the twenty-four contra-power cases, fourteen mention a standard for employer 
liability, if only in passing, and each uses the negligence-based test.411 Only two cases engage in 
any discussion about the rationale behind using the co-worker standard for a subordinate-created 
hostile environment.412 The rest mention the negligence standard without any elaboration as to 
why it is the appropriate standard.413 No court has explicitly adopted a separate standard for 
contra-power harassment. 
In Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., the court discussed the negligence standard as 
appropriate in those cases in which the harasser is not the plaintiff’s “‘employer’ or ‘agent.’”414 
As examples, the court mentioned co-workers or supervisors with no authority over the 
plaintiff.415 That, however, is the extent of the discussion.  Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc. 
contains the most in-depth discussion as to which standard of employer liability should apply.416 
There, the court begins by noting that the employer’s liability depends on the status of the 
harasser and defines the alternatives as either a supervisor or a co-worker.417 After describing 
the negligence standard, the court observed that “most of the harassers were not supervisors but 
were low-level dock workers.  In fact, some of the men who [plaintiff] claims harassed her were 
supervised by [plaintiff] herself.”418 The court then deemed the plaintiff’s status as a supervisor 
irrelevant, and that the relevant issue was the employer’s knowledge of and response to the 
harassment.419 With a bit of a leap in the analysis, the court then held that because the alleged 
harassers were of equal or lesser rank than the plaintiff, the co-employee standard was the 
comparable and appropriate standard.420 
411 See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1997); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 
F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.P.R. 2003); Mingo v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (N.D. Iowa 2000); 
Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 196616 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000); Odom v. St. Louis 
Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Cleveland v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 96-CV-1068(RSP/DNH), 1998 
WL 690915 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998); Johnson v. Prof’l Servs. Group, Inc., No. 4-93-1197, 1996 WL 33324813 
(D. Minn. April 17, 1996); Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Cronin v. United Serv. 
Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr., Civ. A. No. 88-4232, 
1990 WL 267417 (D.N.J. May 26, 1990); Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Perkins v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989). 
412 See Mingo, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 895; Cronin, 809 F. Supp. at 928.  This is not entirely surprising given that nine of 
the fourteen cases were decided before the Supreme Court made clear in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth that the status of the harasser is of paramount importance.  See Faragher, 524 U.S. 
775, 807 (1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998).  However, a contra-power race discrimination case does discuss 
the relevance of the target of the harassment as supervisor.  See Underwood v. Northport Health Servs., 57 F. Supp. 
2d 1289, 1303-04 (1999).  The Underwood court notes that the standard depends on the position of the alleged 
harasser relative to the plaintiff.  Id. at 1303.  It notes the two different standards depending on whether the harasser 
is a supervisor or co-employee and then states that other courts have not addressed what standard applies when the 
plaintiff claims to be harassed by subordinates.  Id. The court holds that the co-employee standard should be used 
because a subordinate is more akin to a co-worker than to a supervisor, and the principles relied upon for supervisor 
cases do not apply to a harasser in a subordinate position.  Id. at 1304. 
413 See, e.g., Kirkland, 741 F. Supp. at 698 (discussing that contra power facts are unlike typical harassment case and 
then using respondeat superior framework without discussing rationale).   
414 Cronin, 809 F. Supp. at 928. 
415 Id.
416 Mingo, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 895. 
417 Id. 
418 Id. 
419 Id. (citing two racial contra-power harassment cases). 
420 Id. 
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A third contra-power case does not discuss the appropriate standard for employer liability 
but contains an interesting discussion of the plaintiff’s actual authority over the harasser.421 In 
Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., the employer argued that the because the plaintiff was the 
store manager, she was responsible to “detect, stop, and report any sexual harassment taking 
place” and that any hostile environment which she suffered was of her own making by her failure 
to discipline the harasser.422 After first recognizing the viability of a contra-power claim,423 the 
court discussed the reality of the plaintiff’s power over the harasser.  The defendants argued that 
the plaintiff was authorized to take any necessary action, including termination, against the 
harasser.424 The plaintiff responded by stating that she did not have the authority to terminate the 
harasser, that her supervisor told her she could not fire or hire without his express permission, 
that she reported the conduct to her supervisor, that he failed to take any action, and that the 
employer failed to provide any training as to how to respond to harassment.425 The court held 
that this discrepancy in the facts precluded summary judgment for the employer.  “[A] jury will 
have to determine whether [plaintiff] had the ability to stop [the] harassment and if so, whether 
she should be held partly or wholly responsible” for damages she suffered.426 The court could 
not have employed the negligence standard because it did not discuss the question of notice to 
the employer or the employer’s response.  Thus, the Lewis court appears to have created a 
standard for contra-power cases wherein the plaintiff will not be able to recover against the 
employer if she failed to exercise any authority she had over the harasser.  Importantly, the court 
does not accept the employer’s assertion that simply because her job title indicates that the 
plaintiff was the supervisor, she could fire the harasser.  However, as mentioned above, the court 
does not explain why these facts matter in a determination of employer liability.   
Other courts, although not as explicitly as the Lewis court, also discussed whether the 
target of the harassment attempted any discipline against the harasser.  The court in Perkins v. 
General Motors Corp. noted that the plaintiff “exercised her authority as a supervisor and had 
[the harasser] sent to labor relations for a disciplinary interview . . . .  Perkins knew how to use 
the available disciplinary procedures and had the supervisory power to stop the conduct and 
punish the offender.”427 The court found for the employer.428 Similarly, in Mingo, the court 
noted that the plaintiff never reprimanded, counseled or disciplined her subordinates.429 Finally 
and somewhat ironically, in Wilson v. University of Texas Health Center, the court noted that the 
plaintiff took no action against her subordinates allegedly engaged in harassment.430 Rather, she 
received a reprimand herself for failing in her duty as police officer to report the harassment 
immediately and for failing to take supervisory action.431 Despite discussing the supervisor-
 
421 See Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 
1996). 
422 Id. 
423 Id. (holding that employer’s argument assumes that employee may not bring claim for hostile environment 




427 Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1497-98 (W.D. Mo. 1989). 
428 Id. at 1501. 
429 Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
430 Wilson v. Univ. Tex. Health Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 958, 959-60 (E.D. Tex. 1991), aff’d, 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 
1992). 
431 Id. at 960. 
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target’s power to discipline the harassers, the courts never explain the relevance of such power 
for an analysis of employer liability. 
Most of the remaining cases gloss over the contra-power nature of the facts.  Of the 
eleven cases that even touch upon the question of employer liability, five found for the plaintiff 
on the issue432 and another made statements in the plaintiff’s favor (although ultimately finding 
against her).433 One case reached judgment in favor of the plaintiff where the employer had 
actual notice “but laughed about it and was utterly unresponsive in remedying the situation.”434 
The court found actual notice where the plaintiff told the general manager of the store about the 
harassment and gave him notes she had kept about the harassment.435 In four of these cases, the 
court denied summary judgment for the employer on the question of employer liability.  As 
discussed above in Lewis, the court determined there was a question as to whether the plaintiff 
had the authority to discipline the harasser and therefore denied summary judgment.436 In 
Cleveland v. International Paper Co., the court found that there was an issue of fact as to 
whether the defendant knew or should have known about the harassing conduct.437 Although the 
plaintiff did not make a formal complaint of harassment until months after it began, she stated 
that she informally told the human resources manager about the conduct.438 The court found that 
this evidence created enough of an issue of fact as to whether the defendant had notice of the 
harassment, particularly because the “human resources office normally is the appropriate avenue 
for discrimination complaints.”439 Similarly, in Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd., the court 
denied summary judgment for the employer because of a dispute as to whether the employer 
responded to notice of the sexual harassment with prompt remedial action.440 The employer 
argued that he reprimanded the harasser and sent both parties to counseling.  After noting that 
Humphreys could show actual notice on the part of the employer, the court reconsidered her 
version of the events.441 According to Humphreys, her supervisor dismissed her complaints, 
criticized her for overreacting, and tried to excuse the behavior by stating that the harasser “could 
not work for and would not take orders from a woman.”442 Therefore, the court denied summary 
judgment. 
 In Mingo, the employer also lost its motion for summary judgment.443 In that case, the 
employer had a written policy for filing sexual harassment complaints which Mingo, the 
plaintiff, did not follow.444 However, both the employer and Mingo stated that there was an 
unwritten policy wherein complaints could be reported to certain supervisory staff, although they 
 
432 See Mingo, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 896-98; Cleveland v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 96-CV-1068(RSP/DNH), 1998 WL 
690915, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998); Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 
685730, at *4-5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996); Humphreys v. Med. Towers Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D. Tex. 
1995); Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 930-31 (M.D. Ala. 1992).    
433 See Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266, 273 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
434 Cronin, 809 F. Supp. at 930. 
435 Id. 
436 Lewis, 1996 WL 685730, at *2.  See also supra notes 421-26 and accompanying text. 
437 See Cleveland, 1998 WL 690915, at *7. 
438 Id. 
439 Id. 
440 Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D. Tex. 1995). 
441 Id. 
442 Id. 
443 Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
444 Id. at 896. 
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disagreed as to which supervisors could receive such complaints.445 Mingo reported her 
complaints to her immediate supervisor.446 The court therefore found that there was an issue of 
fact as to whether Mingo followed the unwritten policy of the employer.447 Further, the court 
found that a jury could find that Mingo was reasonable in bringing her complaints to her 
supervisor who could be expected to report them to the appropriate persons.448 Finally, in Ott v. 
Perk Development Corp., the plaintiff raised a sufficient factual issue on the question of 
employer liability.449 She testified that she reported the alleged harassment to her supervisor and 
that her complaint was not taken seriously, that her supervisor laughed at her and that the 
harasser was merely verbally reprimanded.450 
In the remaining cases which discuss the employer liability prong of the claim, courts 
found that the employer had adequately responded to the complaints of harassment by 
investigating the complaints,451 disciplining the harasser and threatening the harasser with 
termination if the behavior persisted,452 instructing the harasser to have no further contact with 
the target,453 and forcing the harasser into early retirement.454 In Perkins, the court found that 
when the plaintiff did complain about harassing incidents, “appropriate corrective actions were 
taken either by plaintiff individually or in her capacity as a supervisor or by management or 
union officials.”455 In two of the cases, the courts found lack of notice to the employer.  In 
Kirkland v. Brinias, the court noted that the “evidence that the defendant employers recognized, 
or should have recognized, that any of the employees found [the harasser’s] conduct sexually 
offensive, did not preponderate in favor of the plaintiffs.”456 
Thus, the contra-power cases either do not discuss the employer liability standard or 
apply the negligence standard.  In applying the negligence standard, some courts hint that the 
failure of the supervisor-target to exercise any discipline against the harassers undercut her claim 
in some undescribed or unanalyzed manner.  The rest of the courts do not give any special 
 
445 Id.  
446 Id. 
447 Id. at 896-97. 
448 Id. at 898. 
449 Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266, 273 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
450 Id. The court ultimately granted summary judgment for the employer.  The court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation of the magistrate who mystifyingly analyzed the claim under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green burden-shifting scheme.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  The magistrate first 
found that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of sexual harassment.  Ott, 846 F. Supp. at 
273.  The magistrate then considered whether the employer had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions 
against the plaintiff and found that the employer did have such a reason.  Id. at 274.  Finally, the court determined 
that the plaintiff could not meet her burden of proving intentional discrimination and entered summary judgment for 
the employer.  Id. at 274-75.  This is not the typical structure of a hostile environment claim, to say the least. 
451 See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 
1179 (N.D. Iowa 2000).  
452 See Ward, 102 F.3d at 203; Jones, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1179. 
453 See Ward, 102 F.3d at 203.  In addition, the employer offered the plaintiff paid time off, medical leave, 
participation in a medical assistance program, and an escort to and from her car each day. The employer also hired 
experts to perform a risk assessment on the harasser, but the plaintiff refused to cooperate in the study.  Id. at 203. 
454 See Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 148, 159 (D.P.R. 2003). 
455 Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1501 (W.D. Mo. 1989). 
456 Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 698 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).  This holding was stated after finding that the 
plaintiffs and others were subjected to sexual harassment on the job but that it had no psychological effect on the 
plaintiffs.  Id.  See also Garcia, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (finding that plaintiff failed to report certain instances and 
presented no evidence that employer knew or should have known about harassment). 
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Although I agree with much of the criticism of the current employer liability standards, I 
do not argue here for a change in the standards.  Adopting the “actual state of things” 
perspective,457 the two alternatives for employer liability are the Faragher/Ellerth “aided in the 
agency relation” standard with accompanying affirmative defense, and the negligence standard.  
The agency principles rejected by the Supreme Court for holding employers liable for 
supervisory harassment are equally inapplicable to contra-power harassment.  As described 
above, the courts have rejected the scope of employment test, finding harassment to be generally 
outside the scope of employment.458 The options from Restatement section 219(2) are equally 
irrelevant to contra-power harassment.459 In general, there is no non-delegable duty involved, no 
direct liability (the harasser here is not high enough in the organizational hierarchy to be 
considered an “agent” of the employer), and certainly no question of apparent authority in 
contra-power situations.460 This leaves the aided in the agency standard and the negligence 
standard.  Under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Faragher/Ellerth, the aided in the agency 
relationship does not apply.461 The subordinate is not an agent of the employer.  Therefore, 
under the current options, employers could be liable under the negligence standard for contra-
power harassment.462 
How then should the negligence standard work in a contra-power case?  Does the 
standard need to change?  More specifically, should courts adopt the approach of the court in 
Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., and the like: that is, examining the target’s authority to take 
action and discipline the harasser prior to determining the employer’s liability and, presumably, 
finding no liability where the supervisor does not exercise her authority?463 
There is a compelling argument that the supervisor-target of the harassment should be 
required to exercise any power she may have to discipline the harasser, and that if she does not 
do so, the employer cannot be held liable.  Why should the employer be liable when a 
management official is unwilling to exercise that authority given to her?  There is some appeal to 
this argument from the perspective of supporting women’s agency.  The law should not assume 
that women with power cannot exercise that power simply because they are women.  The law 
should not assume that women at work need to be rescued. 
However, requiring female supervisors to take preemptive action excuses an employer 
from preventing, or even paying attention to, the sexual harassment of an entire class of its 
workers.  Such a standard would absolve employers from maintaining a discrimination-free 
 
457 See Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations: An Essay in 
Reaction to Professor Williams’ “Algebra,” 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 435-36 (1988) (referring to Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s statement in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 543 (1832): “‘[w]e proceed, then, to the actual state of 
things . . . .’”). 
458 See supra note 361 and accompanying text.  
459 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958). 
460 Id. 
461 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-64 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775, 801-07 (1998). See also supra notes 369-390 and accompanying text.   
462 Courts and the EEOC have held employers liable for harassment by third party, non-employees under the 
negligence standard.  See, e.g., Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1998) (involving 
sexual harassment by customers); 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(e) (describing negligence standard). 
463 Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996). 
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workplace.  Requiring supervisors who are targets of harassment to take action preemptively 
ignores the realities of how women respond to sexual harassment.464 In fact, the most common 
responses to sexual harassment are avoidance and appeasement (including the use of humor in 
less serious situations).465 The most infrequent response is to seek institutional support, e.g., 
telling a supervisor, bringing a formal complaint, or filing a suit.466 For contra-power 
harassment, the evidence as to reporting is mixed.  Some suggest that victims are more likely to 
report supervisor harassment over co-worker harassment.467 This suggests that targets of sexual 
harassment would report contra-power harassment the least.  However, one study reported that 
contra-power harassment situations were more easily resisted and had better outcomes; when the 
targets were in organizational positions that afforded direct power over the harasser’s 
employment status, there were better opportunities for the target to resolve the situation.468 As a 
result, there were fewer impediments to reporting contra-power harassment.469 Yet, simply 
because women have achieved a certain place in the management hierarchy does not mean that 
they possess actual power to stop the harassment.  As the same study noted, “even if women 
succeed in attaining formal organizational power, they often have less access to informal power, 
derived from access to resources, alliances and informal political influence, which is necessary to 
exercise the power associated with their formal position.”470 In fact, a separate study found that 
contra-power complaints were often dismissed by management.471 In discussing how 
management engages in the construction and interpretation of sexual harassment, this study 
found that some supervisors created an exemption from the sexual harassment policies for same-
sex, contra-power harassment.472 In the particular situation discussed, the supervisors were 
reluctant to intervene because the person who engaged in the questionable conduct was female, 
the lowest-level staffer in the office, and her behavior was considered not very intrusive.473 In 
this way, supervisors and management create obstacles to reporting contra-power harassment.  
In light of this overwhelming evidence, a supervisor who is a target of contra-power 
harassment should not be required to discipline or otherwise take action against the harasser in 
order to have a viable claim.  Rather, the negligence standard should be used.  I believe that the 
negligence standard can be employed in a manner which does not undercut women’s agency, and 
does not place women in a “help me, I’m a girl” role.  Reporting the harassment to supervisors or 
designated human resources persons should count as taking action.  Given the obstacles to 
reporting sexual harassment, notifying the employer is, in fact, an exercise of personal power 
which should be supported and encouraged.474 
464 See Grossman, supra note 15, at 722-29; Beiner, supra note 79, at 173. 
465 Fitzgerald et al., supra note 62, at 120. 
466 Id. at 121. 
467 Id. at 121.  But see James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment: A 
Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 543, 554, 558 (1995) (arguing that targets of harassment 
complain most often when harasser is co-worker rather than supervisor). 
468 Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 47-48. 
469 Id. at 47-48. 
470 Id. at 45. 
471 See Marshall, supra note 110, at 103.  
472 Id.  See also Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 48 (noting that when women do have organizational power, it is 
often resisted or denied through lack of serious attention to their harassment complaints, while men have better 
outcomes). 
473 See Marshall, supra note 110, at 103. 
474 The fear of reprisal is not irrational.  Women who report harassment do suffer adverse consequences.  See 
Grossman, supra note 392, at 52 n.300.   
52
How then should the negligence standard be employed in a contra-power case?  There are 
two parts to the standard: notice and prompt remedial action. 
 
1.  Notice 
As discussed above, there are two ways by which the employer can receive notice of the 
conduct: actual notice and constructive notice.  In fourteen of the contra-power cases, the courts 
mentioned that the targets of the harassment reported the harassment to someone within the 
organization.475 In five of these cases, there was an issue as to whether the target reported to the 
correct official, or the target filed an informal, verbal complaint as opposed to a formal 
complaint.476 The courts should continue to find that the employer has actual notice even if the 
target of the harassment reports to someone outside of the official sexual harassment policy.  If a 
supervisor reports the harassment to someone who can reasonably be expected to report the 
harassment to the proper official, then the employer should be deemed to have actual notice of 
the harassment.   In this way, employers will be encouraged to adopt policies that encourage 
targets of harassment to report.477 Actual notice to the employer then triggers the duty to take 
prompt remedial action.477a 
As for constructive knowledge, the harassment of a supervisor may be more open and 
notorious than that of a line worker, so much so that a mindful employer could not help but 
become aware of the harassment.  In some cases, the supervisor will take pains to hide the fact 
she is being harassed so that her ability to manage is not called into question.  Courts should be 
equally willing to find constructive knowledge in contra-power cases as in other harassment 
cases.     
 
2. Prompt Remedial Action   
 As one of the goals of Title VII is to deter future harassment, the system should provide 
incentives to employers to actually end the harassment.  Thus, employers who explicitly 
authorize the target of the harassment to take action against the harasser should be found 
ordinarily to have met their obligations under Title VII.478 I say “ordinarily” because in 
 
475 See Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Pfahl v. Synthes (USA), 13 F. App’x 
832, 834 (10th Cir. 2001); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 592 (5th Cir. 1995); Hill 
v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 777 (5th Cir. 1983); Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 (D.P.R. 
2003); Needham v. BI, Inc., No. 00 C 1550, 2001 WL 558144, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001); Mingo v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (N.D. 
Iowa 2000); Odom v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900-01 (E.D. Mo. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1347 (8th 
Cir. 2000); Cleveland v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 96-CV-1068(RSP/DNH), 1998 WL 690915, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
1998); Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 
1996); Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672, 683 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. 
Supp. 266, 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Otterstedt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 96 M.S.P.R. 688, 693 (M.S.P.B. 2004). 
476 See Needham, 2001 WL 558144, at *7 (involving “verbal” complaint but no formal complaint); Mingo, 135 F. 
Supp. 2d at 895-98 (involving “verbal” complaint); Jones, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (involving “verbal” complaint 
but no formal complaint); Odom, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 903 n.3 (involving “verbal” complaint but no formal complaint); 
Cleveland, 1998 WL 690915, at*7 (involving situation where target reported “informally”).  
477 See Beiner, supra note 79, at 161. 
477a For an argument that employers should be directly liable for  their role in creating the hostile environment and 
thus notice is not required, see Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 817 (Summer 2005). 
478 See, e.g., Needham, 2001 WL 558144, at * 5 (noting that supervisor told plaintiff to “‘tell [harasser] to stop, you 
are supervisor, direct her to do so’”). 
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particular circumstances, such action may not adequately respond to the harassment.  As the 
Supreme Court of West Virginia discussed in a contra-power case: 
 
[I]f a supervisor complains to her employer of a subordinate’s 
harassment and the employer responds, “You take care of it,” that 
may in some cases be sufficient – if the supervisor has full 
disciplinary authority and circumstances permit use of it.  In other 
cases, however, that response may be inadequate.  The harassed 
supervisor could be the object of an entire crew of male harassers 
and would likely need greater assistance from her employer than a 
flippant, “You handle it.”478a 
Encouraging employers to empower female supervisors will respect women’s choices and 
support the ability of women to choose the role they wish to inhabit at work.  It will also provide 
an incentive to employers to take action that will end the harassment as opposed to simply taking 
“reasonable steps.”479 For example, in DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal Police Officers Ass’n 
and Ott v. Perk Development Corp., the target of the harassment took action in some form 
against the harasser.480 In both cases, the employer supported the exercise of power by the 
plaintiffs481 and in both cases, the court found the employers not to be liable.482 
Similarly, if an employer undercuts or reverses a supervisor’s discipline against a 
harasser, there should be a presumption that the employer failed to take prompt remedial action.  
In Johnson v. Professional Services Group, Inc., the plaintiff reprimanded a subordinate for 
reading a sexually explicit magazine on the job.483 She was told not to take any action against 
any further employees.484 Assuming the remaining elements of the claim are met, the employer 
should be liable in such a situation.   
However, if a supervisor-target reports the harassment and is told by the employer to take 
action but fails to do so, then employer should not be liable.  The employer, on notice of the 
harassment, has chosen to respond to the harassment by delegating the authority to the target of 
the harassment.  She has been given the explicit authority to discipline the harasser.  If she fails 
to act because she is uncomfortable exercising organizational power, the employer should not be 
liable.  Female supervisors should not be excused in such situations from taking action simply 
because they are women.  This would build a “women as victims” mentality into Title VII.   
Giving the female supervisor the explicit power to discipline the harasser may not stop the 
harassment, in which case the employer must take other reasonable measures.  By reporting the 
harassment and receiving explicit authorization to discipline, the supervisor unequivocally 
establishes her power and authority to do so.  In addition, courts must carefully consider if the 
employer has unnecessarily set up the supervisor for retaliation or ostracism by her subordinates.  
 I realize that this explicit authorization standard does not overcome the problem of 
reluctance to report as an initial matter.  Employers must provide an environment that allows 
 
478a Hanlon v. Chambers, 195 W. Va. 99, 108-109, 464 S.E. 2d 741, 750-51 (1995). 
479 See Grossman, supra note 15, at 721-22. 
480 See DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596 (noting that plaintiff reprimanded subordinates for their inappropriate behavior); 
Ott, 846 F. Supp. at 270 (same).   
481 DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596; Ott, 846 F. Supp. at 270.   
482 DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 595-97; Ott, 846 F. Supp. at 274-76.   
483 Johnson v. Prof’l Servs. Group, Inc., No. 4-93-1197, 1996 WL 33324813, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 1996). 
484 Id.  
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targets to express “resistance through both formal and informal channels.”485 The courts should 
remain open to showings that the employer had constructive notice and, therefore, an obligation 
to end the harassment.   
 In applying the negligence standard, courts should not require the supervisor-target to 
exercise discipline preemptively.  Other targets of sexual harassment are not required to engage 
in self-help remedies.  In other cases of sexual harassment, a complaint of sexual harassment 
puts the employer on notice.  There is no compelling reason to create a different rule here.  
Supervisors should be penalized for failing to exercise power only when the employer explicitly 
authorizes the exercise of such power.  Discipline of a tangible nature against a subordinate 
harasser is enough of an official act to put the employer on notice of the sexual harassment.  
Failure to take prompt remedial action, specifically in the form of undermining the supervisor’s 
authority to discipline, should lead to liability. 
 
Conclusion 
 Among the many factors that drive women from the workplace, being harassed as a 
manager is within the grasp of the employer to remedy.  Creating a professional atmosphere and 
promoting more female managers and supervisors should help to diminish sexual harassment.    
The harassment of female managers is not an insubstantial problem.  Courts and employers have 
discounted contra-power harassment because of its contra-power nature.  Instead, courts should 
accept contra-power claims and approach such claims as they would other sexual harassment 
claims.  The status of the target of the harassment should be irrelevant to whether a claim exists, 
how the harassment is perceived, and how the harassment affects the target’s working 
conditions.  Further, courts should not require supervisors to preemptively discipline harassers in 
order to have a claim.  To do so would place a greater burden on those targeted than on 
employers to resolve the epidemic of harassment.  If a supervisor reports that she is being 
harassed, then under the negligence standard the employer has an obligation to remedy the 
problem.  Employers should not be excused from this obligation simply because the target has 
organizational power.  Women who struggle against the odds still present in the workplace to 
reach positions of formal power should be protected by the law and by employers. 
 
485 Fitzgerald et al., supra note 62, at 135. 
